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INTRODUCTION 
Background 
 A cattle producer who desires to promote beef consumption faces two options.  
The first is establishing some criteria to differentiate or brand their beef as different, and 
in some way superior to all other beef.  This requires assuming additional costs with no 
guarantee of a reward, as most beef is quite similar and the federal government already 
sorts and clearly identifies beef by quality grade.  The second option is a cooperative 
effort, where multiple producers pool their money to generically promote beef.  However, 
unless participation was mandated, all producers, regardless of participation, would enjoy 
the benefits. 
This is the dilemma that encouraged beef producers to authorize a generic 
marketing assessment in 1987.  The beef checkoff collects one dollar on each head of 
cattle sold in the United States, and an equivalent amount on foreign cattle and beef.  The 
fee is levied each time cattle change ownership, so an animal may generate several 
dollars for the program over its lifetime.  The entire program collected $84.3 million in 
revenues in 2003 (Cattleman’s Beef Promotion and Research Board).  Approximately 
half of these revenues remain in the state where they were generated to fund marketing 
oriented agendas put forth by state beef councils.  Assessments collected on foreign cattle 
are kept solely for the national campaign, and in 2004 accounted for approximately $8 
million (Henderson, personal communication).  The Cattleman’s Beef Board (CBB) 
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consists of 111 representatives from states with more than 500,000 head of cattle.  
Members are nominated by their respective states’ beef council based upon cattle 
populations (one member for 500,000 head, one member per each additional 1,000,000 
head) and are appointed to the CBB by the Secretary of Agriculture. 
The CBB annually establishes federal expenditure of checkoff revenue with an 
allocation over several activities. Advertising beef is the primary focus, occupying 53% 
of the budget for federal checkoff dollars in 2004.  Another significant proportion of 
money is spent on marketing research1 relevant to the beef industry; food safety and new 
product development are examples of items in this category.  Some of the other activities 
funded by federal checkoff dollars are foreign market development and consumer 
education. 
Replacement Beef Checkoff? 
The Beef Checkoff was initiated in 1987 with approval of 79% of producers.  
Estimates of producer support are frequently sought by concerned industry organizations, 
especially those that receive checkoff dollars.  The CBB funds regular third party 
inquiries of checkoff support.  The most recent survey was conducted in January of 2004 
by Aspen Media and Market Research and concluded that producer support was 
approximately 70%.  Support levels change over time.  The discovery of a BSE infected 
cow in December of 2003 is an example of an event that may change producer support 
levels quickly.  Producers realize that no one individual or organization possesses a 
credible enough or sufficiently loud voice to provide adequate damage control.  In a time 
like this, checkoff dollars are used to communicate the position of the beef industry, and 
                                                 
1 Marketing research refers to an activity that seeks to increase the demand for beef.  The beef checkoff is 
prohibited from funding research that reduces production costs. 
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inform the public what is being done to handle the problem.  Managing public relations is 
one example of how the beef checkoff possesses the characteristics of a public good.  
The pork industry enacted a checkoff program along side the beef checkoff, and 
five years later a mushroom checkoff was established.  Initially, all three programs 
funded marketing campaigns by mandatory per unit fees on the sale of their respective 
commodities.  The pork checkoff has been ruled unconstitutional by a U.S. district court 
(October 2002).  The mushroom checkoff has received the same ruling by the U.S. 
Supreme Court (November 1999).  The beef checkoff has recently received an 
unconstitutional judgment at the federal level (June 2002), and the case has been denied 
an appeal. The Supreme Court will hear the case but the precedent set in the mushroom 
case may lead to a similar ruling. 
Considering the apparently widespread support for the mandatory checkoff and 
the increasing likelihood that the program will be halted, several states have taken steps 
to create replacement checkoffs.  Oklahoma and Texas have established a framework for 
state-level voluntary programs where producers are assessed a per head fee, with a 
provision to allow producers to seek a full refund.  These programs are to be enacted 
upon the cessation of the current beef checkoff.  The Tennessee agriculture commissioner 
put a referendum before the states’ cattle producers asking whether the state should 
institute a similar program.  With a total of 1441 responses, the referendum passed with a 
79% approval rate.  Finally, the Nebraska beef council has charged itself with researching 
and creating a similar state program.   
A voluntary state checkoff with the goal of increasing state-specific beef demand 
would surely not meet that goal.  Consumers will be unable to differentiate beef by state 
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unless a state-of-origin program was enacted.  In the event that such a program were 
enacted, it is unlikely that state allegiance to beef producers would cause the demand for 
beef from one state to change noticeably. 
It may be in the interest of these states to collaborate on voluntary state checkoffs 
in order to maximize their benefits, especially if a large proportion of funds from these 
checkoffs were allocated to advertising.  State beef councils under the current checkoff 
collude to allocate part of their state-level money beyond state lines.  The Federation of 
State Beef Councils has ten seats on the national board and cooperatively allocates some 
state money. 
The Florida Orange Juice program provides a model for state-level checkoffs.  
Lee and Fairchild found that non-Florida growers received a higher benefit from Florida 
orange juice advertising than in-state growers.  Any state not implementing its own beef 
checkoff would free-ride on those states that did.  Producers may be inclined not to 
participate because producers from other states would enjoy the same benefits at no cost. 
The checkoffs currently under development are likely not to be the last, and a 
national voluntary checkoff could be created.  It is likely, and in the case of Oklahoma, 
Texas and Tennessee already evident, that a replacement checkoff will be structured to 
maintain the Federation of State Beef Councils.  By using a checkoff construct similar to 
that of the current program, administrators of a new program would be able to take 
advantage of existing infrastructure and established procedures.  However, a voluntary 
replacement checkoff will have to include provisions that specify how producers may 
abstain from donating.  Potentially the easiest way to establish a means of abstention is to 
collect money on all cattle sales, as is currently done, but offer producers a refund if they 
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request one.  Oklahoma has used this method in legislation that establishes its voluntary 
beef checkoff. 2 
Another way that fees might be collected voluntarily is to ask producers to donate 
rather than require them to do so.  This method is likely to generate less participation than 
a checkoff with mandatory collections and refunds on request.  There is a documented 
relationship in the manner by which programs seek participation and the observed 
participation rate (Johnson and Goldstein).  Consider organ donation.  Many European 
countries have organ donation policies where all people are donors unless steps are taken 
to “opt out.”  Organ donation rates in these countries are frequently in excess of 90%.  
Other nations, including the U.S., have systems where donors must “opt in.”  Donors in 
these nations typically account for less than 30% of the population.  A checkoff could 
expect higher participation if producers had to opt out. 
Another consideration in encouraging participation is the use of a minimum 
participation rate.  The establishment of a level of participation below which all money is 
returned is called a Provision Points Mechanism (PPM).  By reducing uncertainty about 
the extent of free-riding, this method has been employed successfully in the laboratory 
and the field (see Poe et al.) to increase participation in the provision of voluntary public 
goods.  Consider a recent experiment by Messer, Kaiser and Schulze, their experiment 
established a generic advertising program with repeated donations in a laboratory 
environment.  By the eleventh round the program with the PPM experienced a 
participation rate 28.8% higher than the same program without a PPM 
New checkoffs will also be faced with deciding how to allocate funds.  Although 
any checkoff will likely include a marketing program, there are a number of ways in 
                                                 
2 See House Bill 2620 from the 2004 legislative session. 
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which funds can be allocated to fund marketing activities.  Advertising, research, 
education, foreign market expansion or any number of other activities may be beneficial 
at the state and/or federal level.  Ultimately however, a checkoff will need to fund 
activities that are favored by producers.  Producers have perceptions regarding the 
effectiveness of different activities and will be more likely to participate in a program that 
undertakes favorable activities. 
It appears that a voluntary program will emerge in order to continue activities 
currently undertaken by the beef checkoff.  However, an estimate of expected 
participation has not been conducted, and is needed by industry organizations, producers 
and state and federal government.  This estimate is important as the beef industry 
considers whether a checkoff could be funded at a reasonable level.  Since no market 
transactions are available to observe producer preferences for a checkoff, a hypothetical 
experiment is necessary to estimate willingness-to-donate to a checkoff.  A number of 
techniques have been employed to this end including auctions, contingent valuation and 
choice experiments.  A preliminary step will be identification of the most appropriate 
method for this issue.  The result will be an estimated participation rate for a voluntary 
checkoff. 
 Support levels for the current checkoff have been frequently estimated and have 
consistently suggested majority support by producers.  However, a voluntary checkoff is 
not the same program and little is known about producer attitudes towards such a 
program.  Producers will choose to contribute to a checkoff based upon preferences for 
the per-head fee, the activities that the checkoff funds, and the level where the minimum 
participation rate (MPR) is set (if a MPR is used).  Little is known about these attitudes 
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and how they could be expected to contribute to the choice to participate in a checkoff.  
Furthermore, no information is known about the difference in producer attitudes between 
a national and a statewide voluntary checkoff.  
Objectives 
 Is a voluntary checkoff viable? Emerging checkoff(s) will not be expected to have 
100% participation.  Some people will be unwilling to donate under any circumstances.  
There may be types or groups of producers whose members, on average, are less likely to 
participate in a state or national checkoff.  This study is focused on the question: is 
voluntary beef checkoff feasible?  The question is approached from three fronts. 
(1) Measure producer preferences for a voluntary checkoff 
Fee per head sold, expenditure allocation, and minimum participation rate are 
three attributes that make up a voluntary beef checkoff.  The levels at which these 
attributes are set will largely determine which producers choose to participate.  A national 
voluntary checkoff is, in theory, a different good than a state voluntary checkoff.  
Research will begin with an examination of producer preferences for attributes of an 
Oklahoma and a national checkoff. 
(2) Use preferences to identify a utility maximizing checkoff 
Each producer will have different preferences for the attributes of a checkoff.  
However, should a checkoff emerge, administrators will have to choose a specific level 
for each attribute.  The incorporation of producer preferences in checkoff design is 
important in order to encourage participation.  How can the “best” level be determined?  
A hypothetical checkoff will be designed in the realm of a mail survey, through the use of 
a choice experiment.  Analysis of the choice experiment employs conditional logit to 
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estimate a utility function for a checkoff.  The utility function can then be used to design 
a utility maximizing checkoff. 
(3) Evaluate the role of demographics and attitudes towards the propensity to participate 
in a voluntary checkoff 
Taking into account the effects of demographics and attitudes may enhance the 
prediction power of survey results.  The cattle industry consists of several types of 
production and many individuals, and there may be correlations between demographics 
and attitudes and preferences for a checkoff.  Since the demographic makeup of survey 
respondents will not exactly correspond to that of all cattle producers, it is necessary to 
account for any trends in propensity to donate by group.  Doing so allows survey 
respondents to be compared to population of cattle producers, making out of sample 
predictions more precise. 
The next section provides a recap of past research regarding the mandatory beef 
checkoff, survey and analysis techniques and an overview of some theoretical issues with 
respect to a voluntary beef checkoff.  Following that is a description of the survey with a 
look at each question asked on the survey.  The development of the choice experiment, 
which employs random utility theory, will follow.  Results are presented next, and 
concluding remarks are provided in closing. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Beef Checkoff Research 
The United States Congress passed the Beef Promotion and Research Act in 1985, 
which created the Cattleman’s Beef Promotion and Research Board (CBB).  The primary 
role of CBB is administering the beef checkoff (hereafter, “checkoff”), which it has been 
doing since 1987.  The checkoff is a marketing order that assesses cattle producers a per 
head fee in order to provide generic beef advertising and industry related research.  The 
checkoff was established to promote beef demand through advertising, food safety and 
market research, export development, consumer education and other activities.  Naturally, 
there have been multiple inquisitions as to whether or not these activities are effective in 
changing beef demand (Ward, Moon and Medina; Ward and Lambert; Kinnucan et al., 
Brester and Schroeder; Wohlgenant and others).  The findings of these studies are as 
follows. 
Ward, Moon and Medina sought to estimate demand changes in beef directly 
attributable to the checkoff.  The 2002 study examined beef demand in three ways.  
Household consumption estimates were made using two different data sets.  A third 
estimate was made regarding live cattle price change attributable to checkoff activities.  
The household studies suggested consumption has increased between five and six percent 
over the course of the checkoff.  At the live-weight level, Ward, Moon and Medina found 
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a return of $ 5.67 for each advertising dollar.  A previous study found similar results 
regarding the success of checkoff advertising activities (Ward and Lambert). 
Other estimates of returns to advertising from the checkoff have been 
significantly lower than those found by Ward, Moon and Medina and by Ward and 
Lambert.  Kinnucan et al. examined the effects of health information and advertising on 
beef demand, concluding that “ while we can be confidant that meat consumption 
patterns are influenced by relative prices, total meat expenditures, and health 
information, no such confidence can be placed in the effects of advertising.” 3  Brester 
and Schroeder, also estimated returns to advertising and found much lower estimates than 
either the Ward, and Lambert or the Ward, Moon and Medina studies.  Coulibaly and 
Brorsen critique Ward and Lambert and Brester and Schroeder and provide a discussion 
of differences between the two studies.  A data problem is proposed as being responsible 
for the high levels of advertising success concluded by Ward and Lambert.  Problems 
were identified with both studies, but the stability of the results in Ward and Lambert 
deteriorated a great deal more than did those observed in Brester and Schroeder as a 
result of the problems. 
Recall that the total collections for the checkoff in 2003 were $84.3 million, this is 
certainly a significant sum of money for marketing activities.  However, consensus is 
generally found as to the importance of the size of the industry relative to the checkoff 
budget (Ward, Moon and Medina and Kinnucan et al.).  The average beef animal weighs 
approximately 1,150 pounds at the time it is marketed; at early 2004 prices, that animal 
would be worth about $1000.  Assume that, as in Hogan, a beef animal sells 2.74 times 
on average, thereby generating $2.74 for the checkoff.  This amounts to amounts to three 
                                                 
3 Note that some of the promotional activity was checkoff funded, but all of it was generic in nature. 
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tenths of a percent of the animals value going toward the checkoff.  From an empirical 
standpoint, there may be statistical problems associated with estimation of returns from 
checkoff activities.  The scale of activities is quite small given the size of the beef 
industry (Kinnucan et. al). 
Research is the other checkoff-funded activity that has been evaluated in the 
literature, although to a lesser extent than advertising.  The checkoff is constrained to 
fund marketing related research.  An example of marketing research funded by checkoff 
dollars is the creation of new steaks such as the flatiron. This steak is made from cuts that 
were formerly of low value.  The value of the carcass is enhanced, since a steak 
commands a higher price than a roast or ground beef. 
The literature is mixed regarding the benefits of research and advertising. 
Wohlgenant suggests that producers may be best off by spending checkoff dollars on 
research aimed at farm-level cost reduction (if it were allowed), followed by advertising 
and lastly marketing research.  Chung and Kaiser suggest advertising should be most 
preferred, noting that Wohlgenant’s results are quite sensitive to an assumption about 
beef demand, one that may not be accurate.  Actual benefits from checkoff expenditures 
may be highly correlated with the producer perceptions for expenditure allocation.  
Furthermore, the relative benefits from research and advertising are important as the beef 
industry considers the design of a future checkoff.  However, in a voluntary checkoff, 
participation is determined by perceived benefits, regardless of correlation with actual 
benefits.  As a result an accurate measurement of producer preferences for research and 
advertising is important to consider, and will be the objective of this study with regard to 
checkoff benefits. 
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What tools are available to study a voluntary checkoff?  Since no market 
transactions are available for observation, some other method of demand estimation must 
be employed.  The hypothetical construction of a checkoff for an experiment provides a 
way to estimate demand for a checkoff. 
Willingness-to-pay 
Although several state legislatures have taken steps to establish a checkoff, there 
are currently no such programs in action, providing no historical data.  Therefore 
hypothetical checkoffs must be created to generate data.  Demand estimation is not the 
same under hypothetical and observed conditions.  Willingness-to-pay (WTP) is a term 
used to describe an inverse compensated or Hicksian demand (Lusk and Hudson).  The 
WTP estimate provides the maximum amount that an individual would pay for something 
at a given level of consumption.  Recall that a Hicksian demand is a function of prices 
given a level of utility. Thus, the researcher is faced with setting up a utility 
maximization problem.  When there are no revealed preference data available from 
market transactions, the researcher needs to create a hypothetical study to assess probable 
actions.  This is called a stated preference method, and has become a standard tool to 
analyze a variety of goods and policies (Carson, Flores and Meade). 
WTP can be estimated in three ways: contingent valuation, experimental auctions 
and choice experiments (also “conjoint analysis”).  There is an active debate within the 
literature to further the understanding of each method.  Both laboratory experiments and 
field trials are employed in pursuit of the cause.  The next three sections provide an 
overview of each method. 
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Contingent Valuation 
Although not limited to environmental economics, this field is often faced with 
using stated preference methods, as few environmental goods can be valued using market 
data.  For example, a study by Champ et al. looked at willingness-to-pay for road removal 
in the Grand Canyon.  The study is attempting to assign value to a public good in the 
sense that people value a pristine, road-free wilderness area, but have no individual 
incentive to single-handedly undertake the task.  Stated preference studies can also be 
used to value private goods.  For example, Lusk looked at the difference in price people 
will pay for regular rice and genetically engineered golden rice (which has more iron than 
regular white rice).  Both Lusk and Champ et al. used a survey to deliver the experiment. 
In some instances of stated preference studies, subjects have an incentive to 
provide information that does not correspond with true preferences.  For example, in the 
case of a checkoff without a minimum participation rate, people may have an incentive to 
indicate they would participate when in fact they intend to free-ride4.  This course of 
action encourages the development of a checkoff but does not obligate action at a later 
time.  A study design that gives participants reason to provide false information is said to 
have incentive compatibility problems, and the technique used to elicit data must be 
carefully considered to avoid the problem (Lusk and Hudson). 
It is also possible that a subject could give inaccurate information without 
knowing they are doing so.  Studies have shown that this often occurs because people say 
they are willing to pay more for something than they actually are.  This is called 
hypothetical bias and is addressed in depth later. 
                                                 
4 This is not to say that a MPR will change the degree of incentive compatibility, the MPR is included here 
to aid in defining an example of an incentive compatibility problem. 
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Many methods have been used to elicit willingness-to-pay; Lusk and Hudson 
provide a discussion of several popular methods. Contingent valuation (CV) has been the 
workhorse of many stated preference studies.  This method typically presents a double or 
single bounded dichotomous choice (DC) question. In either case the respondent is asked 
to respond yes or no to a question asking if they would pay a certain amount for a 
particular item.  A single bounded question stops here whereas a double bounded 
question does not.  If the answer to the first question was no, then the next question 
presented is the same but offers a lower price, if the initial answer was yes a second 
question is presented at a higher price (Lusk and Hudson).  Lusk used a double bounded 
DC question that read as follows. 
…imagine you are in a grocery store and the price of a1 lb. bag of regular long-
grain white rice is $X. Would you purchase a 1 lb bag of long-grain Golden Rice 
if it cost $Y? 
Depending on the response to this question, Lusk then presented the same question with a 
higher or lower price.  Prices are randomly generated and varied in each question.  WTP 
is estimated by repeatedly observing responses as the offer price varies.   
A summary of the literature on DC questions is provided by Lusk and Hudson and 
summarized here.  The single bounded question is often used because of the ease of 
estimation and the incentive compatibility that it offers.  Double bounded estimates have 
the advantage of producing more statistically efficient results, but have a range of 
criticisms including starting point bias, possible lack of correlation between question one 
and two and incentive compatibility problems. 
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Auctions 
Both in the laboratory and in the field, auctions are a relatively common tool in 
demand elicitation (Lusk and Hudson).  Several variations on auctions have been 
successfully used to value a variety of goods.  All auctions involve a group of bidders 
interested in a particular good jointly determining the price of that good.  English 
auctions begin with an opening bid below the expected final price.  Participants then 
publicly bid the price upwards until only the highest bid remains, at which point the good 
is sold to the highest bidder at the highest bid.  Another type of auction is the Vickery or 
second price auction.  Under this format, sealed bids are submitted and the highest bidder 
again gets to buy the item, but unlike an English auction, the winner of a Vickery auction 
pays the second highest price.  The Becker-DeGroot-Marshak auction presents an interval 
of prices, and asks the bidder to indicate their maximum bid within this interval.  The 
winner of the auction is determined by choosing a price at random, if the participant’s bid 
is greater than or equal to this price, the participant wins the auction at their chosen price 
(Rustrom).  Rustrom noted that prices determined by each of these three auction 
mechanisms were not equivalent.  
Each auction has the potential to be incentive compatible, but there is no ‘best’ 
type of auction for all experiments.  Since the behavior of subjects under different auction 
methods has not been shown to be consistent, consideration must be given to which 
method is most appropriate.  Game theory devotes itself to researching strategies of 
subjects in experimental economics (see Hagel and Roth).  Especially in repeated play 
settings – which auctions frequently are – participants develop strategies, which may or 
may not be detrimental to the precision of the estimates.  This has obviously not been a 
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complete discussion of auction strategy and design, but the point is that buyers in an 
auction have different strategies in different experiments.  Consideration must be paid 
both to auction selection, and the analysis of results.  
Auctions provide a convenient way to value goods in a hypothetical setting.  The 
auction allows the researcher the opportunity to observe people making decisions that 
require market transactions, and it is likely that the incentive to overbid may be 
effectively managed.  However there are a few drawbacks to using auctions.  
Experimental auctions require a great deal of contact with each individual, and often are 
conducted multiple times for a single study.  The rules must be clear to everyone 
involved, and people generally must be physically present to participate in an auction.  
Furthermore, participants must usually be given money to bid with, making the cost of 
the experiment high compared to other mechanisms, and the number of subjects 
relatively small.  Finally, an auction cannot be used to value a public good.  For example, 
consider the road-free Grand Canyon project studied by Champ et al.  Assume that a 
researcher attempts to estimate consumer WTP for this project.  The cost of this project is 
so high that no one individual could likely afford to fund the project single-handedly.  
Auctions are formatted such that there is always a ‘winner,’ however in this case, there 
are no individuals who could win the auction – fund the entire road removal project – 
thus, an auction for this project would have no bidders.  Even if an individual did 
somehow win the auction for this road removal project, there are no property rights to 
accompany winning the auction - no one will likely ever own a deed to the Grand 
Canyon. 
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Several studies in the literature have used contingent valuation and auctions 
provide two methods that have been successfully used to estimate the demand for 
hypothetical goods.  However, the particular problem in this study and a number of 
critiques of these methods suggests further research.  Next, let us consider the choice 
experiment. 
Choice Experiments 
A choice experiment (also “conjoint analysis”) is another method of eliciting 
willingness-to-pay (WTP), and has been used in marketing research, environmental 
economics and other situations where it is desirable to observe the effects of multiple 
attributes on the decision to purchase.  This is a method that presents the subject with 
several hypothetical goods and asks them to select the most preferable.  For example, 
consider a marketing study of WTP for airline tickets.  A conjoint analysis would present 
subjects with multiple tickets, each of which differs by price, type of food served in flight 
and window or aisle seat.  The subject is then asked which ticket contains the most 
desirable bundle of attributes.  At the conclusion of the study the researcher will know 
more about how much the typical consumer will pay for a particular seat and type of 
meal.  Lusk and Schroeder note that a choice experiment attains details about multiple 
attributes of a transaction in one shot, whereas the same level of detail in a CV study 
would require several repetitions. 
Another advantage of this tool is that the choice mimics a shopping experience 
where the consumer must choose between differentiated products at fixed prices (Lusk 
and Hudson; Mackenzie; Lusk and Schroeder).  This may have contributed to several 
studies showing willingness-to-pay estimates that approximate revealed preference data 
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from market transactions (Adamowicz et al.; Carlsson and Martinsson; Lusk and 
Hudson).  In other words, these studies showed that using a choice experiment produced 
WTP estimates without hypothetical bias.  There have been contrary findings where a 
hypothetical bias was present (Norwood 2005; Carlsson, Frykblom and Lagerkvist; Lusk 
and Schroeder), and hypothetical bias should not be ruled out in any hypothetical 
investigation. 
Consider a study of WTP for quality-differentiated beef steaks.  Even though 
hypothetical bias was present, Lusk and Schroeder found marginal WTP (the amount 
someone is willing to pay for one additional unit of a good) to be similar in hypothetical 
situations and real transactions, indicating that with the exception of overstating WTP, 
people tend to behave similarly in hypothetical and real situations.  To explain the finding 
of hypothetical with their choice experiment (where others have found no bias), Lusk and 
Schroeder suggest a problem with excluding an option to choose no transaction.  The lack 
of an option to choose none of the choices is inconsistent with a market decision, and 
may explain why previous studies found no hypothetical bias using conjoint analysis 
(Lusk and Schroeder). 
After data are collected in a conjoint analysis, a random utility model is specified, 
where utility is a function of the price of the good and the good’s attributes.  Random 
utility theory was developed by Marschak, but an excellent discussion is provided by 
Train and discussed here. 
Conjoint analysis allows the researcher to specify a random utility model 
consistent with Lancaster’s theory of consumer demand (Lusk and Schroeder).  Random 
utility theory models a decision as a function of the attributes of the hypothetical good in 
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question.  Conjoint analysis presents several hypothetical goods, which are defined by a 
common set of attributes.  The level that each attribute is set is allowed to vary, making 
each choice distinct.  The decision maker is asked to indicate which good they most 
prefer.  Each of these choices has a corresponding utility function, and since attribute 
levels are randomly varied, each choice will correspond with a different level of utility.  
Utility maximization dictates that the decision maker will select the utility maximizing 
option.  Random utility theory will be developed in greater detail in a subsequent chapter.  
Multinomial logit is typically employed in conjoint analysis, but other methods may be 
used as well (see Lusk and Hudson for a discussion). 
The advantages to a choice experiment are (1) the ability to measure preferences 
for multiple attributes in a single question and (2) a resemblance to the ‘shopping’ 
decision normally made by consumers (Lusk and Schroeder).  However, as far as 
experimental economics is concerned, choice experiments are a new technique.  One of 
the principle concerns of any hypothetical study is that of overstated WTP.  Several 
methods are found in the literature to manage hypothetical bias, indeed in some studies it 
appears that simply using a choice experiment may be another technique toward this end. 
5  Further confirmation of this finding would increase the attractiveness of this method for 
demand estimation in hypothetical situations.  Another promising finding regarding 
choice experiments is the observation of similar marginal WTP in hypothetical and real 
transactions; again however, further confirmation is needed before this finding is 
assumed as consistent.  Although choice experiments seem to be a promising technique, 
careful consideration should be given to construction and analysis of a choice 
experiment. 
                                                 
5 These methods are discussed in the subsequent section. 
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Hypothetical Bias 
Stated preference models often seek to value a good that does not yet exist.  As a 
result, neither researcher nor subject knows for certain the actions that would be taken if 
the same good were actually offered.  In this survey, we ask the potential participant in a 
checkoff to indicate whether or not she would donate to a program that does not yet exist.  
There is a well-documented tendency in hypothetical studies for respondents to indicate 
an unrealistically high level of willingness-to-pay (Norwood 2005; Champ et al.; Poe et 
al).  People often indicate they will pay a certain amount for a good or participate in a 
program but when asked to follow through, they fail to do so.  This overstatement is 
called hypothetical bias.  Some studies propose self-uncertainty as an underlying cause of 
hypothetical bias (Norwood, Lusk and Boyer; Johannesson et al.).  Self-uncertainty 
simply refers to the notion that people asked hypothetical questions often do not know 
how they would behave in real situations. 
Hypothetical bias will enter stated preference methods differently depending on 
the issue.  The voluntary checkoff we present, and likely any that actually emerges, will 
be an all-or-nothing program.  Participants either donate one lump sum or none.  As a 
result, the hypothetical bias we observe will come from people who indicate they will 
donate but do not actually do so, similar to the willingness-to-pay for green power study 
conducted by Champ and Bishop.  This is somewhat of a contrast from the hypothetical 
bias observed in other studies where an individual indicates they are willing to pay one 
amount and then actually pay a different (usually lower) amount.  In managing 
hypothetical bias then, our concern will be identifying non-participants as opposed to 
deflating monetary bids. 
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The preliminary method of dealing with hypothetical bias was proposed by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and involved dividing willingness-to-
pay estimates in half.   This method suggests that people on average say they are willing 
to pay twice what they will actually pay for a good.  List and Gallet attempt to refine this 
method.  They compiled 29 studies in order to examine the difference between 
respondent actions and intentions.  The studies used a variety of techniques to estimate 
hypothetical bias observed under varied research conditions and for a number of different 
goods.   
Variation in the data procurement process and research topic should influence the 
degree of hypothetical bias.  Indeed, List and Gallet suggest that hypothetical bias is not 
constant across all situations, observing a range of bias from less than 100% to over 
1000%, and noting that public goods display a larger bias than private goods.  The typical 
person does not often consciously assess their value for public goods and thus are prone 
to larger errors in doing so (List and Gallet).   
A checkoff has elements of a public good.  No one individual would or could 
undertake the level of activity needed to administer the program and the benefits are non-
exclusive.  The checkoff proposed by this survey and by several state legislatures further 
resembles a public good in that individuals may free-ride on the system, deriving benefits 
provided by the checkoff without paying.  Therefore it is likely that we will encounter a 
hypothetical bias in this survey.  
Calibration 
The use of stated preferences has become a standard practice in valuing non-
market goods (Carson, Flores and Meade).  Results have been promising, but a 
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hypothetical bias should be expected when people are asked to value a good without 
having an obligation to pay.  If left alone, a hypothetical bias will hinder efforts to obtain 
valid estimates of participation under a checkoff. 
Recent research by Champ and Bishop; Norwood 2005; Lusk; Aadland and 
Caplan and others has revealed that several additions may be made to stated preference 
studies in order to help the researcher identify hypothetical bias.  A certainty question 
asks subjects to indicate a level of certainty that stated actions would be the same as real 
actions, and treats uncertain answers as if the subject indicated they would not participate 
or pay anything.  Cheap talk provides a description of hypothetical bias for the 
respondent and asks them to keep it in mind as they answer the survey.  Each of these 
tools has been used successfully to mitigate hypothetical bias and both tools are aimed at 
encouraging respondents to assess their true intentions.   
Certainty Question 
A certainty question has been used by several recent studies (Poe et al., Champ et 
al.; Champ and Bishop 2001; Norwood 2005; Norwood, Lusk and Boyer).  This tool asks 
the respondent to rate, on a scale of one to ten, how certain they are that stated actions 
would be identical to real actions.  A ten is typically regarded as very certain and one is 
very uncertain.  Answers below some threshold level of certainty are coded as unwilling 
to participate regardless of the answer given.  Champ and Bishop found that a threshold 
of eight (where answers are recoded to “no” if less than eight) resulted in actual and 
stated donations being statistically indistinguishable.  Note that using a certainty question 
does not eliminate hypothetical bias from survey responses.  Rather, we look for 
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hypothetical bias after the fact and attempt to extract the hypothetical bias by data 
calibration. 
The certainty question allows people who feel strongly about an issue a chance to 
be identified from those who are only lukewarm about it.  Assuming that a survey 
respondent seriously assesses their intentions, the researcher should be justified in placing 
greater weight on responses from subjects who express higher certainty.  Several pieces 
of research have supported this theory and demonstrated zero hypothetical bias in 
comparing split sample studies.  In these studies, the construct was such that half the 
subjects received a certainty scale on a hypothetical question and half the subjects were 
asked for actual donations to match stated intentions (Champ and Bishop; Champ et al.).  
An example of a certainty question from Champ and Bishop is provided in Figure 1. 
 
On a scale of one to ten, where 1 means “very uncertain” and 10 means  “very certain,” 
how certain are you that you would purchase the wind power offered in question one if 
you had the opportunity to actually purchase it? 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Very Uncertain                                                                                      Very Certain 
 
Figure 1. Certainty Question from Champ and Bishop 
 
These studies found that calibrating responses with a certainty question and an 
eight threshold resulted in equal estimates from stated and revealed preferences.  
However, Poe et al. and Norwood 2005 showed that using a certainty scale with a 
threshold of eight produced estimates that under-predicted true values.  So what can 
certainty calibration contribute?  Note that certainty calibration with a threshold of eight 
seems to either eliminate hypothetical bias or underestimate WTP.  Since uncalibrated 
estimates likely overestimate WTP, using both uncalibrated and calibrated data creates an 
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interval that should contain true WTP (Norwood 2005).  Next, consider cheap talk.  This 
is another method that shows promise in reducing or eliminating hypothetical bias. 
Cheap Talk 
Cheap talk does not adjust survey responses; rather it seeks to obtain more 
realistic responses (Lusk).  In employing cheap talk, the researcher introduces 
hypothetical bias prior to asking a subject to complete the research question.  The script 
defines exactly what hypothetical bias is, and how prevalent the phenomenon has been in 
previous studies.  Next, the respondent is asked to consider what they would actually do 
if the decision were real and involved giving up money. 
Lusk; List; and Cummings and Taylor found that a good deal of detail was needed 
in a long cheap talk script in order to successfully reduce hypothetical bias.  In fact, the 
cheap talk employed by Lusk was over a page long.  This was a dichotomous choice 
study to estimate willingness-to-pay for golden rice.  The script gave an example of 
hypothetical bias from a previous food study and even explained a suggested thought 
process to use in addressing the valuation question.  The Lusk study showed that 
willingness-to-pay was reduced by cheap talk.  However, because there is no way to 
observe actual willingness-to-pay for this food item it was not possible to see if the 
hypothetical bias was totally removed or just reduced. 
Aadland and Caplan had split sample data that allowed them to research 
hypothetical bias in greater detail, and specifically addressed the ability of cheap talk to 
reduce hypothetical bias.  They evaluated willingness-to-pay for curbside recycling in an 
area where some people currently participate in the program and others have not even 
heard of curbside recycling.  This sample allowed them to look at both stated and 
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revealed preferences for the same good.  Contrary to other studies Aadland and Caplan 
used a much shorter version of cheap talk; their script was worded as follows. 
Studies have shown that many people say they are willing to pay more for 
curbside recycling than they actually will pay when (it/curbside recycling) 
becomes available in their community.  For this reason, as I read the next two 
curbside recycling fees, please imagine your household actually paying them. 
 
Although shorter, this script did indeed reduce hypothetical bias.  Also of interest, 
Aadland and Caplan jointly employed both cheap talk and certainty calibration, and 
found that the two methods jointly reduced hypothetical bias more than either method 
individually. 
The length of a cheap talk script used can be important in reducing hypothetical 
bias (note the differences between Aadland and Caplan and Lusk).  Another factor that 
contributes to the effects of cheap talk is respondent experience. Lusk and List suggest 
that some respondents are more likely to respond to cheap talk than others.  This may be 
a similar phenomenon as that of the certainty question.  Some respondents appear to be 
more prone to overestimate their willingness-to-pay.  Respondents who are familiar with 
the topic being assessed are unresponsive to cheap talk (Lusk; List).  Put another way, 
respondents knowledgeable with the survey topic appear to be more certain that they are 
making an accurate assessment of their value for the good in question. 
The literature on both cheap talk and certainty questions suggests that not all 
survey respondents overstate willingness-to-pay at the same level.  The challenge will be 
to determine which respondents are providing unrealistic responses.  As Norwood, Lusk 
and Boyer point out, it is likely that even calibrated estimates will be biased, however 
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cheap talk and certainty scales have shown promise in reducing hypothetical bias and 
may nonetheless help improve forecasts of participation in a checkoff. 
Calibration and cheap talk will be implemented in this study to mitigate the 
effects of hypothetical bias because, under a voluntary checkoff, some cattle producers 
will not participate.  People who do not participate either believe that there are no 
benefits provided to anyone, or believe that they will receive benefits from a checkoff 
and do not feel obligated to donate.  Whatever the reason, there are people who will free-
ride on a checkoff.  What does the literature say about free-riders, and is there any way to 
reduce the number of people that free-ride?  The next section will review the literature on 
free-riding and discuss a mechanism which may reduce it. 
Free Riders in Public Good Provision 
The decision to participate in a checkoff will be based upon different factors for 
different cattle producers.  One of the foremost things that will be considered by 
producers will be the determination of an expected participation rate (Isaac, Schmidtz and 
Walker).  Public goods provide benefits to everyone within the scope of the good, 
regardless of participation.  The benefits of a checkoff, while non-exclusive, are also 
positively correlated with the level of participation.  In other words, if few people 
participate, the benefits will be small.  An incentive is thus created for producers to know 
how many of their peers are participating, and how many are free-riding.   
The mandatory checkoff meets most of the conditions of a public good.  Under 
the current program, one dollar per head is collected each time an animal is sold.  No 
matter the stage of production, one dollar per animal is not a considerable percentage of 
the value of a beef animal.  Yet this dollar collected on all cattle sold in a year generates a 
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significant amount of money (e.g. $84.3 million in 2003).  While the current checkoff has 
many characteristics of a public good, it does not allow for free-riding.  The government 
compels participation and provides substantial civil penalties (large fines) for non-
compliance. 
The checkoffs under development at the state level (OK, TN, TX and NB) are 
similar to the current program in many ways, making them resemble public goods.  Any 
public good where free-riding is possible should be expected to have free-riders (Poe et 
al.).  Additionally if state-level programs are enacted, free-riding between states would 
become a likely possibility.  The theory behind interstate free-riding is similar to the 
expectation of free-riding at the producer level.  It would not be practical to differentiate 
beef by state and information obtained from research is generally non-exclusive, so other 
states could take advantage of advertising and research without implementing a program.  
Because free-riding is expected, and will reduce checkoff revenue, it is prudent to 
consider methods by which free-riding could be discouraged.  Are there any techniques 
that can be used to accomplish this goal? 
Provision Point Mechanism 
Experimental economics has frequently used voluntary contributions methods 
(VCM) to study donations to public goods (Rondeau, Schulze and Poe; Hagel and Roth; 
Norwood 2005).  Variations on VCM methods exist but, the overriding idea is that 
participants are given a certain amount of money with which they are to participate in the 
study.  Participants are asked to use the money to donate to a public good constructed for 
the experiment.  If enough people contribute then the group will receive a profit in excess 
of their original donation.  Hagel and Roth provide a discussion of several experiments 
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that used a VCM to elicit a value estimate for a public good.  While estimates of the 
magnitude of free-riding are varied, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that free-
riding is a frequently occurring phenomenon.  Poe et al. and Rondeau, Schulze and Poe 
both estimate that VCM experiments regularly under-value public goods by 40-60% 
(evidence of free-riding).   
Many experiments concerning free-riders and public good valuation have been 
conducted in the controlled environment of the laboratory (Hagel and Roth).  These 
studies are often able to approximate true demand for a public good after using repeated 
iterations with the same subjects.  Many applied research projects (including this one) do 
not have the luxury of multiple attempts at demand revelation.  In this case Poe et al. calls 
for the use of a “one shot” mechanism, and in an experimental setting used a provision 
point mechanism (PPM) to accomplish the task. 
A PPM defines a population of potential contributors to a public good, and 
establishes a minimum participation rate for this population.  If this participation target is 
not met, all money is returned.  Messer, Kaiser, and Schulze implemented a PPM to 
control free-riding in a laboratory based advertising program and realized participation 
rates 20% higher than in a similar program, without a PPM.  Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker 
discuss an “assurance problem” as the reason that a PPM is able to control free-riding.  
The theory is that potential participants in a public good understand the free-rider 
problem and see the benefits of a public good.  The PPM provides a way for participants 
to assure themselves that they are not providing a good that is heavily free ridden on.  
True demand has been approximated using a PPM both in an experimental setting 
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(Rondeau, Schulze and Poe; Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker) and in an applied setting (Poe 
et al.). 
A contrary finding on effective PPM use was reported by Stephen King (the 
suspense novelist).  King conducted an online experiment with his readers.  An 
announcement on King’s website stated that a new novel would be provided online at the 
rate of one chapter per month as long as 75% of people paid one dollar per installment.  
Readers failed to meet the participation rate before the novel was concluded.  
Nonetheless, a PPM deserves a closer look for inclusion in a checkoff. 
A provision point mechanism is of interest to us for its apparent ability to reduce 
free-riding under a voluntary checkoff.  Both producers and administrators have an 
incentive to see a checkoff succeed, and the PPM seems to be one way to encourage 
higher participation rates.  However, including the mechanism introduces the risk of 
triggering a complete refund.  A prudent step in designing this survey then, is measuring 
the influence of a PPM on checkoff participation.  Do the potential gains in participation 
outweigh the risk of a total refund? 
Summary 
 A checkoff appears likely to emerge in several states, and could do so at a 
nationwide level as well.  Since no market transactions are present, studying emerging 
checkoffs requires the construction of a hypothetical experiment.  A survey allows access 
to a large number of potential respondents and, sent by mail, is not prohibitively 
expensive.  A choice experiment may be presented on a mail survey and has the 
advantage of simulating a real market decision by presenting several hypothetical 
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options.  While this tool is relatively new, it appears to be incentive compatible, and 
allows for the examination of multiple attributes simultaneously. 
Attempts to value hypothetical public goods typically result in an overstatement 
of willingness-to-pay.  Two tools have been implemented successfully in the literature to 
reduce this hypothetical bias.  Using uncertainty as a means to calibrate answers lessens 
hypothetical bias by changing the answers of uncertain respondents from “willing to 
participate” to “unwilling to participate.”  Cheap talk informs research subjects that 
people typically over estimate their own WTP and has been shown to reduce the extent of 
overestimation.  The expectation of a hypothetical bias implies that uncalibrated 
estimates will likely overestimate WTP.  Jointly using calibration and cheap talk will 
likely produce WTP estimates that are either unbiased or underestimated.  Thus, a 
reasonable approach is to present both types of estimates in a type of confidence interval 
(Norwood 2005). 
Since any voluntary public good is subject to free-riding, the questions addressed 
by this research seek to understand and minimize free-riding.  A provision points 
mechanism has been used to increase participation in public good provision.  However, 
the implementation of this mechanism carries with it the risk of triggering a total refund 
and no information is currently available regarding beef producer preferences for a PPM. 
The next section begins by developing the survey that will deliver the choice 
experiment.  Later in the section, demographic and attitude questions are developed and 
presented.  Demographics and attitudes are important because they may be correlated 
with preferences for a checkoff. 
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DATA AND SURVEY DESCRIPTION 
Survey Design and Pretesting 
Data for this research have been provided by Bailey Norwood, an Assistant 
Professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics at Oklahoma State University, 
from a survey that was mailed in January of 2004.  The survey was administered on an 
8.5″ by 11″ booklet, printed front and back (a total of four pages).  Additionally, an 
informational insert about the mandatory checkoff was provided outlining both the 
program and the legal challenges that have been made against it.  The first two pages of 
the survey presented the choice experiment for a national and state checkoff respectively.  
Pages three and four presented a series of demographic and attitude questions.  The 
survey was printed on paper with Oklahoma State University insignia and a return 
envelope was enclosed to increase response rates. 
Pretesting was conducted using three undergraduate classes at Oklahoma State 
University with the restriction that only self acknowledged cattle industry participants 
complete the survey.  An animal nutrition class, a cow-calf production class and an 
econometrics course participated in the pretest.  Students were told that their responses 
were being used for pretesting.  In addition, they were informed that their responses were 
of interest, and instructed to respond as if they had just received the survey by mail.  The 
students were given the survey with the informational page, just as producers would 
receive the survey in the mail. 
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A pretest response sheet was included, inviting students to highlight areas that 
were not clear, questions that did not make sense, omitted questions which needed to be 
included and the amount of time required to complete the survey.  Appendix A provides 
this pretest form.  Responses from pretesting were used to refine the survey format, 
correct confusing language, and seek perspectives similar to those of the survey sample 
population.  Feedback from these sample subjects was constructive and prompted several 
minor changes.  In addition, the second choice experiment was added after the pretest 
was used the same format as the first. 6 
Sample Population 
The sample population was obtained through the Oklahoma office of the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS).  A total of 2,950 respondents were chosen to 
obtain a stratified sample of the Oklahoma beef industry and 705 surveys were returned 
resulting in a response rate of 23.9%.  The sample included the following sectors of the 
beef industry: weaned calf, feeder/stocker cattle, purebred bulls and heifers, fed cattle and 
veal calves.7  Oklahoma has demographics different from that of the national average.  
Figure 2 displays some of the notable differences between Oklahoma and the national 
average in production of calves, feeder cattle, and cattle on feed.8  Also note Figure 3, 
which shows the percentages of cattle by industry segment owned by producers who 
responded to the survey.   
The largest representation of cattle producers was in the sector of feeder cattle.  
However, the important thing from a statistical efficiency perspective is that all segments 
                                                 
6 The “second choice experiment” refers to the state-level checkoff question. 
7 A definition and explanation of each of these producer types is provided later. 
8 These are the types of cattle for which the most robust statistics are kept, and make up the typical 
commercial beef animal. 
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of the industry be surveyed, not that the true proportion be represented.  Results are 
studied later to look for differences in propensity to donate due to demographics and 
attitudes.  If there are indeed differences, results may be adjusted to more accurately 
reflect all producers by comparing survey results to known statistics such as those kept by 
NASS. 
 
OK Demographics (Difference from U.S. Average) source: NASS
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Figure 2 Oklahoma Demographics 
Notes:  ACTUAL OKLAHOMA STATISTICS: comparison of Oklahoma cattle 
production to nationwide cattle production for 2000-2003.  0 represents the national 
average (source: NASS). 
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Figure 3. Survey Demographics 
Notes:  SURVEY STATISTICS (N=705): an estimate of the cattle population 
represented in the survey.  Each category figured by: (average number of cattle sold 
times number of producers who sold that type of cattle) divided by total number of cattle 
of all types.  All numbers based on midpoints of survey responses. 
 
Choice Experiment Construction 
To elicit preferences for a voluntary beef checkoff, survey respondents are 
presented with a choice between two checkoffs or none, at the national and state level.  
The attributes that make up each checkoff are varied across surveys by: the amount of the 
refundable fee; the spending allocation over research, advertising and other; and the level 
of the minimum participation rate (MPR). 
Several constraints must be considered.  One consideration important in designing 
this question is having the total funding allocation sum to one.  Advertising, research and 
other are the only three options provided for budget allocation, as a result they should to 
sum to one hundred percent.  Fee per head sold is another checkoff attribute.  At some 
level of fee, no producers will participate. As a result the survey was constrained so that 
the fee was ‘reasonable.’ (e.g. not offering a fee of twenty dollars per head).  The MPR is 
another attribute, and should not take values of 100% or 0% in the choice experiment, as 
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a MPR taking one of these extremes does not make any sense.  Table 1 gives the range 
that these checkoff attributes took in the survey. 
Table 1. Checkoff Attribute Ranges in the Choice Experiment 
  Fee MPR Advertising Research Other 
Maximum $2.00  90% 85% 75% 80% 
Minimum $0.20  5% 0% 0% 5% 
Notes:  Values were randomly generated and changed in 
increments of $.05 and 5% 
 
Respondents were presented a total of four hypothetical checkoffs (two 
nationwide programs and two Oklahoma programs) in two questions, with the possibility 
to select a refund at both levels.  Each question is formatted identically and varies the 
same checkoff attributes.  The primary difference between the state and national checkoff 
is that a national program already exists.  In order to incorporate the status quo of the 
current national checkoff, the first of the two voluntary national checkoffs has the same 
expenditure allocation as the current program.  Because there is no state program to 
compare to, the two state checkoffs have attributes that are randomly generated in the 
same manner as the second nationwide program. 
One result of the lack of a status quo contrast may be preference estimates that 
reflect a greater level of uncertainty at the state-level.  Respondents have seemingly less 
experience with a state checkoff and may be less certain about the value they place on it.  
Although each state retains a portion of the checkoff dollar, there are no state level 
checkoffs independent of the Beef Promotion and Research Act.  Self-uncertainty 
(Norwood 2005) could explain the lower explanatory power of the predicted state 
checkoff.   This phenomenon may be more significant in the case of a more novel 
hypothetical good (statewide voluntary relative to nationwide voluntary checkoff).  
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Figure 4. Choice Experiment 
 
Figure 4 presents the choice experiment for the national level checkoff as it was 
presented in the survey.  The presentation of the state checkoff was identical, less the 
status quo expenditure allocation of option A.  
The attributes in the choice experiment, the ranges of which were presented in 
Table 1, are generated at random to ensure that there are no statistical problems 
associated with attributes moving together within surveys.  Because utility from a 
checkoff is specified as a function of checkoff attributes, it is necessary to ensure that 
attributes are independent of each other between the two checkoffs.  Information is 
gained in a choice experiment by observing utility gain or loss from changing attributes, 
if two or more attributes move together, the utility change cannot be assigned to a 
Checkoff 
Attribute 
 
Option A Option B Option C 
Checkoff Fee 
 
 
$0.70 / head sold $0.75 / head sold 
Minimum 
Participation Rate 
 
55% 10% 
Percent of Funds 
Spent on 
Advertising and 
Promotion 
 
53% 65% 
Percent of Funds 
Spent on Research 
 
10% 15% 
Percent Spent on 
Other Activities* 
 
37% 20% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither A nor B is 
preferred.  If these 
were the only two 
options available, I 
would request my 
checkoff fees be 
refunded in full. 
 
 
I would choose 
(please check 
ONLY ONE 
OPTION) 
I choose option A 
and would not 
request a refund 
 
I choose Option B 
and would not 
request a refund 
I choose 
neither A nor 
B.  I would 
request a 
refund 
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particular attribute.  Table 2 provides the summary statistics for responses to the choice 
experiment. 
Table 2. Selection of a Checkoff or a Refund (Choice Experiment) 
Responses 
                    (N=705)  
National Checkoff n % 
Checkoff A  284 42.5 
Checkoff B  152 22.7 
Refund  233 34.8 
    
State Checkoff   
Checkoff A  201 30.4 
Checkoff B 
Refund  
192 
268 
29.0 
40.5 
Notes:  Distribution of responses between one of two checkoffs or a 
refund.  Recall national checkoff A was the status quo expenditure  
option.  The n column is the number of respondents who selected the  
given option.  The n columns do not sum to 705 because some  
respondents did not complete both or one of the choice experiments. 
 
Cheap talk and calibration have not yet been incorporated.  As we proceed to do so, note 
that in both a state and federal checkoff, a majority of producers prefer a checkoff over a 
refund. 
Removing Hypothetical Bias 
 The first page on the survey booklet contains a short paragraph providing 
instructions for completion of the choice experiment.  The last sentence in these 
instructions is the cheap talk script (see Figure 5 for exact wording).  The instructions for 
the choice experiment are identical in both questions with the exception of the 
differentiation needed to communicate that one of the questions is in regards to an 
Oklahoma only checkoff while the other is nationwide. 
Cheap talk scripts are generally fairly long (Lusk), however a much shorter script 
is used here.  Consider the multiple hypothetical bias management techniques.  The 
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choice experiment itself has demonstrated a mitigating effect on hypothetical bias 
(Carlsson and Martinsson).  Further, the certainty question and the cheap talk script have 
demonstrated their ability to reduce the effects of overstated WTP in multiple studies 
(Lusk; Champ et al.).  There are three mechanisms that are likely to reduce hypothetical 
bias estimates, thus it is not necessary to emphasize cheap talk by providing a long 
discussion.  Studies that employed long scripts generally relied solely on cheap talk to 
manage hypothetical bias. 
…These are hypothetical checkoffs, and studies have found that people 
overstate their willingness-to-participate in hypothetical situations.  
Before answering, please think hard about how you would choose if it 
entailed giving up real money. 
 
Figure 5. Cheap Talk 
 
The certainty question does not require significant instruction.  People are 
generally quite familiar and comfortable with rating something on a scale of one to ten; 
for example, many sporting events are judged on this scale.  Recall that using this 
mechanism to mitigate hypothetical bias involves identifying uncertain answers in which 
a checkoff was chosen, and recoding the responses such that the uncertain “I would chose 
checkoff j” will be treated as if the response chosen was “ I would choose a refund.”  The 
certainty question reads as follows: 
On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means "very uncertain" and 10 means "very 
certain", how certain are you that you would voluntarily pay the checkoff fee for 
the option you chose? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
         very                                                                                                       very                                           
      uncertain                                                                                             certain 
 
Figure 6. Certainty Question 
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The certainty question is used in both the state and national checkoff, and placed 
immediately following the choice experiment.  The threshold where answers are recoded 
is set at eight, the same level used in several recent studies (Champ and Bishop; Poe et 
al.).  However, calibration is still a young and somewhat unproven tool, and the level at 
which answers are recoded is by no means a proven constant.  Norwood 2005 succinctly 
points out that the researcher could return to a data set (if reveled preference data are 
available) and recode at various levels until an unbiased result is obtained.  Nonetheless, 
using a certainty level of eight seems to be somewhat of a benchmark at this time, and 
has generated approximately unbiased estimates on several occasions.  Since it is 
expected that calibrated data may provide unbiased results or underestimated willingness-
to-donate, uncalibrated results will be provided jointly with calibrated results as a 
‘confidence interval’ (Norwood 2005). 
 This concludes the formal portion of the choice experiment.  However, 
demographics and attitudes are important, and will later be incorporated into the results 
of the choice experiment.  Let us now discuss some of the demographics and attitudes 
that may correlate with preferences for a checkoff. 
Other Survey Questions 
This section provides discussion and summary statistics for demographic and 
attitude questions.  Formatting is as follows:  a discussion of each question is presented; 
including the reason(s) each is asked.  Next, the question is given, and finally summary 
statistics and comments on responses are provided.  In addition to verification that the 
sample population was appropriately broad across all sectors of the Oklahoma beef 
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industry, these questions will reveal whether demographics and attitudes correlate with 
preferences for a checkoff.9 
Demographic Questions 
Cattle Operation Demographics 
The beef cattle industry has multiple sectors, four of which are involved with the 
live animal and thus pay into the current checkoff (meat sellers do not pay).  The first 
stage of the production process occurs when a calf is born.  This stage is known as 
cow/calf production.  Cow/calf producers typically have a large investment in breeding 
cows and the land and machinery required to feed, breed and house them.  Similar to the 
cow/calf operator in investment and management, the seedstock producer raises purebred 
animals to sell to cow/calf producers as breeding animals.  After the calf stage (birth-500 
lbs.), the beef animal is often referred to as a feeder or a stocker.  A feeder animal is 
about 500 pounds and has been weaned from its mother.  Feeder cattle producers 
typically buy calves from cow/calf producers with the goal of feeding the young animals 
until they gain several hundred pounds.  This stage of production may require ownership 
of little more than the animals themselves, as feed is typically the only requirement and is 
often obtained by renting pasture.  The final stage in beef production (for the live animal) 
is the feedlot.  The feedlot operator confines many animals and feeds them concentrated 
rations to bring them to a finished weight of about 1200 pounds.  The feedlot operator has 
a high investment in facilities and machinery and a large requirement for capital to 
purchase feed and feeder cattle.  Compared to pork and poultry, the beef industry has not 
                                                 
9 The methodology of investigating these relationships is left for the next chapter. 
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been significantly vertically integrated.  As a result an animal may be bought and sold 
three or four times with each sale being to a different owner.   
Type of cattle raised may impact propensity to donate to a checkoff because of the 
rather significant cross section of capital requirements and goals at each stage of the beef 
industry.  Number of cattle produced may be important because of the structure of a 
checkoff.  For example, it is possible that a cattle feeder who turns over 100,000 head of 
fed cattle a year will have preferences for a checkoff than a cow-calf producer who sells 
40 weaned calves per year.  In order to research potential differences between different 
types of participants in the cattle industry, the following question was asked: 
 
Question: In the boxes below, please indicate the average number of cattle and calves 
you sold in the past year. 
 
Oklahoma is suited for some types of beef production better than others.  The 
state is a leader in wheat production, since wheat is a feed source for feeder cattle, there 
are a large number of feeder cattle.  Indeed, of the 705 producers who returned surveys, 
475 sold some feeder cattle.  Cow-calf producers often use range or improved pasture to 
raise their animals, of which there is a plentiful amount in Oklahoma.  Some 548 survey 
respondents had sold weaned calves in the previous year.  Cattle feeders buy cattle from 
feeder producers and directly from cow calf producers.  Because cattle feeders pool the 
cattle of many producers together, there are by definition fewer feeders than other types 
of producers.  In addition, Oklahoma is 6th in fed cattle production (NASS); surrounding 
states such as Kansas and Texas have higher concentrations of cattle feeders than 
Oklahoma.  The survey had 195 respondents who indicated they typically sold fed cattle.  
  42 
Finally, a total of 147 survey respondents indicated that they typically sold purebred bulls 
or heifers. 
Respondents were asked to indicate how many of each type of cattle (calves, 
feeders, breeding stock and fed cattle) they sold in an average year.  Although typically a 
by-product of the dairy industry, we also asked producers to indicate how many veal 
calves they sold.  Veal calves are slaughtered when they are very young, and are typically 
the offspring of dairy animals.  It is important to consider the veal animal because 
checkoff dollars are currently collected on all cattle that enter the food supply, regardless 
of whether the animal was raised on a dairy.  There were 52 producers that indicated they 
sold veal calves.  Consider the distribution of responses by cattle type and number sold, 
these data are in Table 3.  
Table 3. Respondent Cattle Operation Summary 
       Weaned    
        Calves    Feeder Cattle         Fed Cattle     Veal Calves 
     Purebred   
      Animals 
Range n Range n Range n Range n Range n 
0 106 0 168 0 425 0 561 0 478
<50 170 <100 175 <500 132 <50 41 <50 114
50-99 156 100-499 133 500-999 33 50-99 6 50-99 18
100-199 71 500-999 85 1000-9999 21 100-199 3 100-199 13
200-499 89 1000-4999 70 10,000-19,999 2 200-499 2 200-499 2 
500≥  63 5000≥  12 20, 000≥  7 500≥  0 500≥  0 
Notes:  Responses to question regarding farm size and type.  The range column is the 
interval offered as a potential response.  The n column reflects how many producers 
indicated they sold a particular type and number of cattle.  For example: 106 producers 
indicated they sold 0 weaned calves 
 
The U.S. dairy industry creates beef as a byproduct from several avenues: the 
male calves born to milking cows, the excess heifers not grown to replace old milking 
cows and the cows that it retires from milking.  Beef and dairy producers have different 
goals, management strategies and typically are in different locations, but ultimately, both 
contribute to the beef supply and some produce both beef and dairy breeds.  Dairy breeds 
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are not excluded from the mandatory checkoff when they are sold, and would likely be 
treated much the same in any new checkoff.  Producers of these different animals may 
have differing views on a voluntary beef checkoff.  We next asked survey respondents 
this question. 
Question: Do you raise beef, dairy, or both cattle breeds? 
 
 The capital allocation of a dairy is similar to that of a cattle feeder.  Oklahoma is 
not heavily invested nor particularly well suited for dairy production.  There were 19 
survey respondents who sold some dairy cattle, while only four had exclusively dairy 
cattle.  These few respondents will not allow for robust observation of the difference 
between dairyman and beef producers. 
 After providing a structure in which to estimate the production patterns of survey 
respondents, let us now consider group membership.  Many different agricultural groups 
exist and have a variety of purposes and types of members.  Some of these groups are 
more involved in the beef industry than others and a consistent position on a checkoff is 
generally lacking based upon formal position statements. 
Group Affiliation 
 There are many agricultural organizations with an interest in the beef industry.  
Some of the groups are: breed organizations such as the American Angus Association, 
policy groups such as Farm Bureau, industry groups like the National Cattleman’s Beef 
Association (NCBA) and segment groups like the Texas Cattle Feeders Association.  
Affiliation with a group may have some correlation with propensity to donate to a 
checkoff.  Consider that one of the plaintiffs in the case against the current checkoff is an 
industry group (the Livestock Marketing Association).  There are too many groups to 
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include in one survey question, and group affiliation is ultimately not the main objective 
of this study.  However, careful selection of a few groups may reveal whether there is a 
tendency for group membership in general to change propensity to donate, and measure 
that impact for the specific groups chosen.  
Question: Please check any farm organizations in which you are a member. 
 
 The groups included on the survey are: The Oklahoma Cattleman’s Association 
(OCA), the National Cattleman’s Beef Association (NCBA), Ranchers Cattlemans Legal 
Action Fund (R-CALF), National Farmers Union (NFU), Oklahoma Farm Bureau 
(OFBA) and the American Farm Bureau (AFBA).  The position on and stake in a 
checkoff is varied significantly by this selection.  The National Farmer’s Union formerly 
opposes the mandatory checkoff but says that it favors a voluntary program.  R-CALF 
maintains a formal position of neutrality. Contrast this with NCBA, a group that receives 
checkoff funds and favors the current program, and American Farm Bureau, which has 
signed a friend of the court brief in favor of keeping the mandatory checkoff. 
Additionally, a blank line is provided to allow respondents to list other 
organizations.  Keep in mind that the concern is not specific group membership.  The 
reason for including a write in line is to prevent offense being taken by not listing a 
group.  Inclusion of all groups is not possible, however, omitting a group may cause 
offense to be taken by producers who feel the exclusion of their group implies 
unimportance.  An offended respondent may fail to respond or respond inaccurately in 
protest.  The write in line allows a way to address this problem.   
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OCA
29%
NCBA
13%
R-CALF
7%NFU
7%
OFBA
39%
AFBA
5%
 
Figure 7. Group Affiliation 
Notes:  Although 508 people responded that they belonged to a group, some belong to 
more than one.  This figure shows the sum of all groups, and the percentage that each 
represents of all group membership.  Thus the interpretation for AFBA is:  “5% of all 
group membership is with AFBA,” not that 5% of respondents belong to AFBA and 
likewise for others. 
 
Notice that four of the choices offer related/similar organizations at the state and 
federal level (e.g. Oklahoma Farm Bureau and American Farm Bureau and Oklahoma 
and National Cattleman’s Associations).  Respondents to the survey belonged to the state 
level organizations in higher proportion than corresponding national organizations.  It 
should be noted that 197 of the 705 surveys returned did not select any of the options 
provided, these 197 individuals may belong to a group, but they did not indicate one of 
those offered on the survey.  Next, consider household income.  Income will vary across 
farms for a number of reasons, larger farms will generally have larger incomes, but some 
farms may not be self-sustaining enterprises. 
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Household Income 
Propensity to donate to a checkoff may change by income.  There are at least two 
matters to address in looking at respondent income, one of which is total household 
income.  Producers may be more or less likely to donate to a checkoff based upon their 
income.  Because of the fee-per-head structure that the current and proposed voluntary 
checkoff operates under, it does not appear that a checkoff would have a problem with 
producers believing a larger or smaller producer fails to pay “their fair share.”  
Nonetheless, donating to a checkoff diverts money available for other purchases, thus 
producers with smaller incomes may be less likely to donate.   
Income relative to farm size is another potential demographic that can be 
examined.  Preferences may differ based upon how much income is generated by cattle 
production.  People are in beef production for different reasons.  Some are dependant 
upon their farms for a livelihood, while others buy a farm for a tax write-off.  This 
relationship is not addressed in a single question, however, the inclusion of size questions 
previously discussed and the subsequent income question will allow for measurement of 
an interaction between the two.  The income question read as follows. 
Question: As close as you can recall, please estimate your household's yearly 
income before taxes by checking the appropriate box.  This question is 
used to ensure our sample is representative of all producers.  Please 
remember that your responses will be held strictly confidential. 
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<20
4% 20-39
19%
40-59
23%60-79
17%
80 +
37%
 
Figure 8. Producer Household Income 
Notes:  In thousands of dollars; average: $ 66,448.  Average income is calculated by 
multiplying the midpoint of each income interval times the number of producers who 
indicated a particular income, and dividing by the total number of people who answered 
the question.  On the open ends, values of $100,000 and $18,000 were selected. 
 
Figure 8 deconstructs the income of the 665 survey respondents who answered the 
question regarding household income.  Note that this question is addressing total 
household income as opposed to farm income.  It will be useful to have an average 
income estimate for the survey responses.  However, approximately 40 people did not 
respond to the question, this makes their income appear to be zero, which is obviously 
not the case.  To counter this, average income is calculated by dropping all non-responses 
to the question.  Survey respondents average income was $66,448.  A comparison with 
other income statistics reveals that the income observed for survey respondents is larger 
than the Oklahoma non-farm household income, which averaged $35,500 in the period of 
2000-2002 (U.S. Census).  However, these same statistics show that U.S. farm income is 
substantially larger than non-farm income, thus a more accurate comparison for survey 
respondents is found elsewhere.   
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Our survey was only sent to cattle producers, a group that falls under farm income 
population statistics.  Thus a more accurate comparison to the entire population of cattle 
producers is found in farm income statistics.  Farm income projections for the year 2004 
show that respondent income from this survey is close to the national average of $66,732 
(NASS).  It should be noted that survey average is calculated based upon respondents 
choosing between five ranges of incomes.  Midpoints for the three closed intervals and 
the values of $18,000 on the low end and $100,000 on the high end are used in the 
calculation.10  As a result, the income data represent all incomes over $80,000 the same, 
with the likely result being an underestimate of average income. 11 
This concludes the demographic questions asked on the survey.  Demographics 
are important to consider because they may correlate with checkoff preferences.  In 
addition, these questions reveal the composition of survey respondents, ensuring that an 
appropriately broad sample was obtained.  Like demographics, attitudes are important to 
consider because they may correlate with preferences, and thus help explain producer 
utility for a checkoff. 
 
Opinion Questions 
Awareness of Court Proceedings 
Other checkoffs have used transaction costs as a way to encourage participation.  
Consider the Oklahoma wheat checkoff, which requires that producers desiring a refund 
write the Wheat Board and formally request it.  The transaction cost is the effort and time 
                                                 
10 These estimates are the authors “best guess.”  See Figure 8 for the survey responses. 
11 $80,000 is the highest income that could be indicated in response to this question. 
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required to get the money back.  Some producers will donate because the transaction 
costs outweigh the benefits of obtaining a refund.  
 The refund mechanisms already established in the Oklahoma and Texas 
legislation operate in a similar fashion, both to each other and to the wheat program 
previously described.  It may be reasonable to expect that there will be beef producers 
who donate because their benefits do not exceed the transaction costs of the acquisition.12  
A level of awareness of industry issues may identify producers who fit this category.  A 
producer who is unaware of current industry issues does not derive enough benefit from 
awareness to outweigh the transaction cost of acquiring information.  If this relationship 
is true, a producer who does not follow beef industry news might be more likely not to 
seek a refund.  A question to identify people who have a relatively low interest in 
following industry news is: 
Question: Were you aware of the recent litigation and court rulings on the beef 
checkoff before receiving this survey?   
 
 The hypothesis that apathy may induce non-participation is not measurable in a 
hypothetical experiment.  However, if this relationship does exist, the proportion of 
people who were unaware of checkoff litigation would be useful to know.  In addition, 
there may be a correlation between awareness of litigation and willingness-to-donate.  
Responses to this question revealed that 36% of producers who received the survey were 
unaware of the case pending against the current program.  What about a correlation 
between support of the current program and preferences for a voluntary checkoff?  If 
producers who support the mandatory checkoff are more likely to participate in a future 
program, a substitute relationship emerges. 
                                                 
12 Think of this as “donation by apathy.” 
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Support for the Mandatory Checkoff 
The Cattleman’s Beef Board (CBB) has historically surveyed cattle producers 
semiannually to estimate support for the checkoff.  Even though participation has been 
mandatory, administrators and benefactors have an incentive to keep producers happy.  
As evidenced by the suit against the checkoff, only a few are needed to bring a lawsuit.   
The mandatory beef checkoff was initiated by a vote of producers, and was 
implemented with 79% of producers in favor of the program.  The CBB survey is 
independently conducted to be representative of all beef and dairy producers, and the last 
three years have shown support levels in the range of 60 to 70 percent (NCBA).  The 
most recent volume of this ongoing survey was conducted in January of 2004 (the same 
time this checkoff feasibility survey went out).  The CBB survey found that about 70% of 
producers supported the mandatory checkoff. 
Because of the similarities between any voluntary checkoff and the current 
mandatory program, it is prudent to investigate respondent support of the current 
program.   
Question: Which best describes your feelings toward the challenge to the mandatory beef 
checkoff? 
 
This question offers the alternatives of: “ I am in favor of keeping the mandatory 
checkoff” or “ I am in favor of eliminating the mandatory checkoff.”  Responses to this 
question indicated lower estimates of producer support than those obtained historically.  
Of the 684 respondents who answered this question, 57% were in favor of keeping the 
mandatory checkoff.  One explanation for a lower support rate is that producers are now 
presented with an alternative.  Producers may be less inclined to support a mandatory 
  51 
checkoff if a voluntary program is seen emerging with the same agenda.  A final note on 
this question is that 68% respondents who were aware of the checkoff litigation are also 
in favor of the mandatory checkoff’s continued operation.  Note that this is consistent 
with the recent nationally estimated support level. 
Next, consider the operations of the current checkoff.  How do producers perceive 
the benefits of the mandatory checkoff benefit them?  Do the benefits return to the 
producer, or are they held by processors and retailers? 
Perceived Benefit Allocation 
 Beef is the end product in cattle production.  However, the beef checkoff does not 
assess a fee to meat sales, as a result meat processors and retailers do not contribute to the 
beef checkoff.  Do the benefits of beef promotion and research return to producers?  If 
producers are under the impression that the answer is no, they may be more likely to 
abstain from participating in a checkoff.  To address opinions about the allocation of 
benefits to producers relative to processors and retailers, the following questions were 
asked. 
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Question: Do you feel beef checkoff expenditures on advertising benefits cattle 
producers or beef processors and retailers more?  
producers
10%
processor/retailer
35%
both equal
42%
undecided
13%
 
Figure 9. Perceived Advertising Benefits 
 
 
Question: Do you feel beef checkoff expenditures on research benefits cattle 
producers or beef processors and retailers more? 
producers
18%
processor/retailer
26%
both =
37%
undecided
19%
 
Figure 10. Perceived Research Benefits 
 
If packers and retailers were able to exercise market power and have some 
influence over price, producers would have less incentive to promote an increase in the 
demand for beef by funding these activities.  In both the research and advertising 
questions, over 50% of respondents indicated that producers benefited equally or less 
than packers.  As previously mentioned, the beef industry is relatively less vertically 
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organized than other commodities.  However, the meat packing industry has become 
quite concentrated, with the top four firms accounting for over 80% of all cattle 
slaughtered in 1999 (Field and Taylor).  Results suggest that there may be perceptions 
that this four firm ratio is indicative of market power in the beef industry. 
Similarly, how do producers believe benefits flow to foreign producers?  If 
benefits are perceived to flow out of the country, producers would be less likely to 
participate in a checkoff. 
Domestic vs. Foreign 
 The benefits of the beef checkoff in a global economy may not be exclusive to 
producers in the United States.  Under the mandatory checkoff, imported cattle are 
assessed an exchange rate adjusted, one dollar fee in the same way as domestic 
producers.  Additionally, there is a fee assessed on imported beef.  Free-riding by 
imported beef is thus eliminated.  Producers may or may not be aware of the fact that 
imported cattle are assessed the same fee as domestic animals.  In either case, producers 
may perceive that foreign benefit from the current or any future checkoff is not a 
desirable trait.  If the level of foreign benefit is perceived to be high, producers may react 
by showing a lower propensity to donate to a voluntary program. 
Question: How do you feel the beef checkoff funds benefit cattle and beef 
producers outside of the U.S.? 
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Foreign
7%
Domestic = 
Foreign
17%
Domestic > 
Foreign
37%
Other/Uncertain
39%
 
Figure 11. Allocation of Benefits Foreign vs. Domestic 
Less than a quarter (24%) of respondents who answered this question felt 
domestic benefits were equal to or less than foreign benefits, and only 7% felt that 
foreign producers benefited to a larger extent than domestic producers.  The results of 
this question suggest that producers are unsure of the benefit allocation between foreign 
and domestic cattle producers.  Four of the ten demographic/attitude questions (this one 
included) had a choice to select “unsure” or “undecided.”  In the other three questions, 
uncertainty was indicated by 13-19 percent of producers.  For this question more than 
double the number of producers were unsure, with 39 percent of producers selecting the 
option “other or unsure.”   
Summary 
The goal of this paper is to examine checkoff preferences in survey responses to 
estimate the actions of other potential participants.  A question has been designed under 
the framework of a choice experiment to measure checkoff preferences.  Cheap talk and 
certainty scales are employed to reduce the expected hypothetical bias.  In order to 
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increase the prediction power of survey responses, demographics and attitudes are 
sought. 
 The sample, chosen by NASS, was selected to include only cattle producers in 
Oklahoma.  Feeder cattle comprised the largest number of cattle owned by producers who 
completed and returned surveys, followed closely by weaned calves.  Producers of fed 
cattle, veal calves and purebred breeding animals were represented in smaller numbers.  
About seventy percent of respondents indicated that they belonged to one of the six 
agricultural groups, with state-level membership more common than national group 
membership. Household income averaged $66,448, which is consistent with average U.S. 
farm income. 
 Consistent with previous support estimates, returned surveys showed a majority in 
favor of the continuance of a mandatory checkoff.  The perceived benefit allocation of 
the current beef checkoff suggests that producers perceive beef processors to have some 
degree of market power.  Less than 20 percent of producers believe that the benefits of 
research and advertising are distributed to producers more than retailers and processors. 
The random utility model that is developed next will allow measurement of 
preferences for checkoff attributes.  Using this model, a utility maximizing checkoff can 
be designed, and estimates of participation can be made. 
  56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
The objective of this research is to measure preferences for a voluntary beef 
checkoff (hereafter “checkoff”).  Specific goals include using preferences to design an 
optimal checkoff and measuring the correlation between producer demographics/attitudes 
and utility for a checkoff.  Research is conducted through a choice experiment, which is 
designed to simulate the decision to donate to a checkoff.  Random utility theory is used 
to model preferences, as described later in this chapter. 
This section is organized as follows.  We begin with a discussion of how the 
choice experiment provides a means to measure preferences.  The random utility model 
for a checkoff is presented next.  This model is estimated from the results of the choice 
experiment and is used to measure preferences, forecast participation and study how 
preferences are linked to demographics and attitudes. 
Recall the structure of the choice experiment from chapter three.  Consider one 
choice experiment, with two checkoffs and a refund.  The attributes varied between 
checkoffs are: fee, expenditure allocation (advertising, research and other), and 
minimum participation rate (MPR).  Respondents were asked to indicate whether they 
preferred one of the checkoffs or a refund.  If a respondent decides he prefers a checkoff, 
he must decide which one is more preferred.  Let us work through the decision-making 
process to determine how preferences will be measured, assuming that a checkoff is 
chosen, and looking at one attribute at a time. 
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The first attribute is fee, respondents must decide if they prefer the relatively 
higher fee or lower fee.  The actual level of fee is randomly generated within an interval 
presumed to be reasonable.  Information is obtained about fee preferences by observing 
all respondents choosing a fee.  As more choices are observed within this interval, an 
estimate of the fee that is most preferred should be revealed. 
In the same way, survey respondents must consider MPR.  Observing respondents 
making a choice of a MPR reveals preferences for this attribute.  Again, values for this 
attribute were randomly generated across surveys, and allow inference into optimal levels 
by observing repeated choices. 
Now consider expenditure allocation.  Imagine that the following allocations are 
presented (advertising, research and other). 
A   53:10:37 
B   20:30:50 
Assume a hypothetical respondent; for clarity, call her Jane.  It is unlikely that Jane 
favors one of the expenditure mixes exactly as presented.  Nonetheless, she must assign 
importance to each attribute and choose an allocation.  Imagine that Jane believes 
research is the most beneficial activity, followed by advertising and lastly, other 
activities.  Expectations are that she will select option B.  Even though this choice 
appears to signify that Jane prefers other activities to advertising, option B has the larger 
amount of research.  Information has been gained through this choice by observing that 
Jane prefers funds be directed to research over advertising and other.  As in fee and 
MPR, data on allocation preferences are obtained by observing the actions of all 
respondents making this same type of decision repeatedly. 
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Preferences are also measured with respect to the relative weight of each checkoff 
attribute in comparison to the others.  As in the case of Jane choosing a budget allocation, 
respondents must decide the weight that they place on each checkoff attribute, and pick 
the bundle of attributes that best indicates preferences.  Even though any given choice 
experiment may not be exactly what a producer favors, the repeated responses are 
sufficient to measure preferences. 
The outcome of the choice experiment is a measurement of preference for 
individual checkoff characteristics and of relative preferences for each attribute over the 
others.  Furthermore, by selecting attributes that match preferences, an optimal checkoff 
can be designed.  Preferences are actually measured by specifying a utility function for a 
checkoff using random utility theory.  This model is derived next as in Train. 
Random Utility Model 
Random utility theory allows for the deconstruction of a choice into the attributes 
of the choice.  Under this theory, developed by Marschak in 1960, the utility from a 
choice is represented as a function of the attributes of that choice.  Assuming utility 
maximization, the researcher knows that the choice selected has the highest level of 
utility.  Let utility of respondent i for checkoff j be represented as ijU .   
Random utility theory recognizes that the researcher cannot know all 
contributions to utility.  Let ijV  be the knowable portion of respondents i's utility for 
checkoff j, which is common across all individuals.  Not all utility derived from a 
checkoff is known from the survey, as a result let ijε be a random error accounting for 
unknown utility. 
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(1)         ij ij ijU V ε= +                 
Since utility from a choice is a function of the attributes of the item chosen, ijV  may be 
written as a linear combination of checkoff attributes: 
(2)    1 2 3 4 5( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ij ij ij ij ij ijV B Fee B Adv B Rsrch B Other B MPR= + + + +        
Where Fee is the voluntary fee per head sold, Adv is the percent of the budget spent on 
advertising, Rscrh is the percent of the budget spent on research, Other is the percent of 
the budget spent on other activities, and MPR is the minimum participation rate. 
Note the absence of an intercept.  It is assumed that the utility obtained from the 
attributes of the choice stems only from the level of those attributes.  Additionally, the 
choice set design implies an expenditure allocation such that 1Adv Rsrch Other+ + = .  
As a result an intercept would be a perfect linear combination of the budget allocation, 
thereby precluding its estimation. 
Respondent utility for a checkoff may not be a linear function of checkoff 
attributes.  Consider the Fee variable.  Even if producers view this as an investment, a 
positive sign in a linear model implies an infinite fee.  This is obviously not 
representative of true preferences.  Now consider the expenditure allocation variables.  If 
producers favor a mix of expenditure activities, the expenditure parameters must exhibit a 
diminishing marginal utility.  Finally, as to MPR, a producer is expected to gain utility 
from knowing that his or her donation is not being extensively free-ridden upon.  
Intuition suggests that at some level of participation, an increase in MPR will lead to a 
higher probability of the MPR not being met, again suggesting non-linear utility change 
from attributes.  For these reasons, it appears that optimal checkoff attributes may be 
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interior solutions, suggesting a quadratic model as more appropriate.  Another 
specification of ijV  is: 
(3)       
2
1 2 3 4 5 6
2 2 2 2
7 8 9 10
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
ij ij ij ij
V B Fee B Adv B Rsrch B Other B MPR B Fee
B Adv B Rsrch B Other B MPR
= + + + + + +
+ + +  
 
Table 4 provides sign expectations as to the contribution of each variable to the level of 
utility for a checkoff. 
Table 4. Expected Signs of Utility Parameters 
 
Let equation (3) be represented generically as ij ijV = X B .  Respondent i's utility 
for checkoff j can now be represented as  
Variable Name Description Expected Sign Comment 
Fee 
 
Fee2 
Fee assessed per head 
of cattle sold 
+ 
 
- 
Fee is expected to have an 
optimal level, that if exceeded, 
reduces utility for a checkoff 
Adv 
 
Adv2 
Percent of total 
budget spent on 
advertising and 
promotion 
+ 
 
- 
Expect that some, but not all, 
money is preferred to be spent 
on advertising 
Rsrch 
 
Rsrch2 
Percent of total 
budget spent on 
Research 
+ 
 
- 
Expect that some, but not all, 
money is preferred to be spent 
on research 
Other 
 
Other2 
Percent of total 
budget spent on other 
marketing activities 
+ 
 
- 
Expect that some, but not all, 
money is preferred to be spent 
on other activities 
MPR 
 
MPR2 
The participation rate, 
that if not met, 
triggers a refund of all 
money 
+ 
 
- 
Higher participation means 
fewer free riders and a larger 
budget to carryout activities. 
Expect diminishing marginal 
change as MPR approaches 1 
(100%) 
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(4)     ij ij ijU = X B+ε  . 
The state and federal checkoffs will be studied as if they are different goods, thus 
implying that they have separate utility functions.  However, both are presented in the 
survey by using the same five attributes presented in Table 4.  Let the variable Fi be a 
dummy variable taking a value of one if a checkoff is a federal program and zero 
otherwise. 
Rewriting equation (4) to incorporate this variable yields: 
(5)  2 21 2 3 4(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )ij ij i ij i ij i ij i iU X B F X B F X B F X B F ε= − + + − + +  
Where iX  is a matrix of checkoff attributes [ Feeij  Advij  Rsrchij  Otherij  MPRij], 
2
ijX  is 
a matrix of checkoff attributes squared [ Fee2ij  Adv2ij  Rsrch2ij  Other2ij  MPR2ij], and Bi is 
a conformable column vector for parameters.  Now that a utility function has been 
designed, how do we estimate the model?  The conditional logit approach is next 
employed to estimate the parameter vectors that represent respondent preferences from 
survey data. 
Conditional Logit Model Development 
Estimating the random utility model entails specifying a distribution for the 
stochastic component of utility,εij , and employing maximum likelihood estimation.  Let 
εij be distributed according to the extreme value distribution, which is a special case of 
the Gumbel distribution.  The probability distribution function is as follows: 
(6)                                              ( )( ) ef e e
εεε −=  
The extreme value distribution is bell-shaped with slightly fatter tails than the normal 
distribution.  Its mean and variance are  -0.577216 and 1.644934 respectively.  The 
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distribution of the error allows for probability statements to be made based upon the 
assumption that respondents maximize utility in checkoff selection.  Under this 
assumption, the utility of the choice made is higher than the utility of the other two 
choices.  Utility is not on a cardinal scale, and even if it was, the researcher cannot know 
what value utility takes for a given subject.  In fact, the researcher does not need to know 
such a value.  The researcher is only concerned with the relative utility of each choice.  
Let 0iU  represent the utility associated with selecting a refund
13.  When respondent i 
selects checkoff 1 over checkoff 2 and over a refund, it must be that: 
(7)      1 2 0 1 1 2 2 0i i i i i iU U U X B X Bε ε ε> > ⇒ + > + >  
As Train shows, the probability of this choice is: 
(8)                 Pr( ) Pr( )ij ij ik ikj j k= > ∀ ≠X B + ε X B + ε      
(8.1)              Pr( )ij ik ik ij j kε ε ⎡ ⎤= > + − ∀ ≠⎣ ⎦X X B  
 
Utility derived from seeking a refund equals 0ε .  Errors are distributed according 
to the extreme value distribution thus the probability of respondent i selecting choice one 
(a checkoff) is:  
(9)     
1
1 2 0
Pr(1) e
e e e
= + +
i
i i
X B
X B X B   (Train) 
Let 1iy be an indicator variable, which takes a value of one if respondent i chooses 
checkoff one, zero otherwise.  In the same way let 2iy  and 0iy  take a value of one if 
checkoff two or a refund is chosen and zero otherwise.  The joint probability, or 
likelihood function, for respondent i is:  
                                                 
13 Utility from a refund is equivalent to setting Xik for the refund option equal to a vector of zeros. 
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(10)   
1 2
1 2 0
0
3 3 3
1 1 1
i i i
i
j j j
y y y
e e eLF
e e e
= = =
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑
i i
ij ij ij
X B X B
X B X B X B
for 1,..,i N=  
The likelihood function for all responses, is then given by the product of LFi over 
all individuals.  The utility parameters are selected by maximizing the natural logarithm 
of the likelihood function (Train). 
(11)      
1
ln( ) ln
N
i
i
LF Lf
=
= ∏  
Equation (11) is maximized using the fminunc function in MATLAB.  The parameters are 
unconstrained and reflect the relative marginal impact to utility as a result of each 
attribute.  Nominal parameter values mean relatively little.  Rather, the sign and relative 
magnitude are of interest in order to weigh attributes against each other and observe 
preferences.  Let us now move towards checkoff design. 
Checkoff Design 
Once utility parameters are estimated, one can proceed towards identifying the 
type of checkoff that will maximize producer utility.  Specifically, the Microsoft EXCEL 
Solver feature was used to select the checkoff attributes (fee, adv, rsrch, other and MPR) 
that maximize utility, subject to the relevant constraints. 
Recall that the budget allocation was dissected into three parts.  Advertising 
(Adv), research (Rsrch) and other activities (Other) make up the only possible ways to 
allocate checkoff proceeds.  Each is a percent of spending, and thus the three must sum to 
100% of expenditures for the hypothetical checkoff(s) that emerge from the survey 
results. 
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(12)        1Adv Rsrch Other+ + =  
The parameter estimates measure preferences and thus may have negative signs to 
indicate negative feelings towards an attribute in a checkoff.  However, the attributes 
themselves must be non-negative.  
(13)          0jX >  
A third constraint implicit to the checkoff is that MPR<Participation.  Let us 
define participation under this model.  Recall equation (9), which determines the 
probability of a choice in an individual survey.  This decision had three possible 
outcomes.  A real world program would not provide two checkoffs to choose between, 
and thus (9) is not valid for forecasting participation beyond the survey.  The probability 
of a respondent donating to a checkoff is: 
(14)         Pr( )
1
edonate
e
= +
i
i
X B
X B  (Train) 
Note the difference between equations (9) and (14) is the number of choices.  The 
exponential utility function for a second checkoff has been dropped from the denominator 
to reflect the fact that an actual participant will either select donation to a checkoff or a 
refund. 
Participation rates calculated in this manner are estimates.  A margin of error at 
twenty percent is sufficient to be confident of a true participation rate (Norwood 2004).  
Thus if the model predicts a participation rate of 50% the actual participation rate will be 
between 30% and 70%.  However, checkoff administrators and participants are 
concerned only with under-participation.  Constraining MPR to be less than participation 
by at least twenty percent will sufficiently incorporate the uncertainty of the method and 
allow for confidence in checkoff design.  A third constraint for utility maximization is: 
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(15)   Pr( ) 20%donate MPR≥ +  
 The probability of donating is based upon behavior by the individual, but may 
also be interpreted as an expected participation rate for a population; assuming that 
preferences observed in the survey hold across the population.  The sample size 
(responses = 705) and stratification across industry segments are assumed to be sufficient 
for this assumption.  However, demographic and attitudinal data, which may have 
correlations by group to different levels of utility, are available on producers who 
responded to the survey.  Determining if any of the demographics and attitudes observed 
in the survey do correlate with lower or higher utility for a checkoff and then adjusting 
participation estimates accordingly will allow for the most robust results available. 
Demographics and Attitudes 
 If willingness-to-donate is indeed heterogeneous across any of these 
demographics and/or attitudes, checkoff design should consider the differences and adjust 
estimates accordingly before drawing conclusions at a more broad level.  How can these 
data be incorporated into the utility model, as they are not attributes of a checkoff?  
Because of the correlation between some different level of utility and an attitude or 
characteristic, the data can be included by way of a dummy variable within the utility 
function to indicate fixed effects.  Questions were answered in a multiple-choice format 
where a respondent indicated they had a characteristic or attitude by checking a box. 
The clearest way to incorporate these responses into the utility model is through 
the use of dummy variables.  For example, imagine that there is suspicion that members 
of the group R-CALF are less likely to participate in a checkoff than respondents who do 
not belong to the organization.  A dummy variable taking a value of one if a respondent 
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belonged to the group, and zero otherwise, would be incorporated in the utility model.  If 
the parameter estimate was found to be significant, and demonstrated a negative sign, 
then R-CALF members do indeed derive less utility for a checkoff and would be less 
likely to participate. 
The same method may be applied to an attitude.  For example consider the 
attitude that checkoff benefits return at a disproportionately high level to foreign 
producers.  Producers who have this attitude should derive less utility from participation 
in a checkoff.  Again, a dummy variable will capture this attitude, taking a value of one if 
a producer has this opinion and zero otherwise.  What is accomplished in measuring the 
effect of attitudes on utility?  Correlation between attitudes and utility may be useful in 
explaining why a producer chooses donation or abstention.  Not truly a measure of 
causation, this information is nonetheless useful, and may aid in checkoff design by 
suggesting a need to address opinions that hinder participation. 
Results are next, following approximately the same outline used in this chapter.  
The next chapter proceeds by: development of a model to measure preferences, 
expansion of that model to accommodate checkoff design, and finally incorporation of 
demographics and attitudes.
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RESULTS 
Return again for a moment to the research question:  Is a voluntary beef checkoff 
feasible?  As discussed previously, a thorough answer will address several issues: 
• What checkoff design is most preferred by cattle producers? 
• Under the optimal checkoff design, what percent of producers will participate? 
• How do the demographics and attitudes of participants and non-participants 
differ? 
 
This chapter will answer these questions based upon survey results of 705 Oklahoma beef 
producers.  In analyzing the survey, which was constructed using a choice experiment, 
the starting point is identifying producer preferences for the attributes comprising a 
voluntary beef checkoff (hereafter “checkoff”).  The attributes up for consideration in 
checkoff design are: expenditure allocation (advertising, research and other), fee and 
minimum participation rate (MPR)14. 
Checkoff Design 
 First, to succinctly summarize checkoff preferences, the survey responses are used 
to estimate a linear random utility model.  But what data will be used?  Recall that in an 
effort to reduce hypothetical bias, the certainty calibration technique was employed, thus 
uncalibrated and calibrated data are available from the same sample.  Chapters two and 
three discuss this technique.  Several studies have demonstrated that calibration provides 
                                                 
14 For a discussion of these elements of a checkoff, refer to Chapter Four (page 60). 
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relatively unbiased estimates of true values (Champ and Bishop 2001; Champ et al.).  
However, both calibrated and uncalibrated data contain the effects of cheap talk, which 
has been shown to reduce hypothetical bias (Lusk; Aadland and Caplan).  As a result, if 
estimates from calibrated data are biased, it is likely in the direction of underestimating 
willingness-to-donate.  If uncalibrated data are biased it is likely in the direction of 
overestimation.  For the purpose of checkoff design both, calibrated and uncalibrated 
models will be given, with the assumption that this provides something of a confidence 
interval for true estimates (as in Norwood 2005). 
A further note on the data:  some surveys contained mistakes or omissions that 
prevented them from being used.  For example some producers did not indicate they sold 
cattle, this is a problem for a number of reasons.  Since only beef producers contribute to 
the checkoff, we are interested only in their responses.  Furthermore, we will investigate 
the link between type of cattle produced and preferences for a checkoff.  Not knowing if 
or what type of cattle a producer sells does not accommodate either of these matters and 
observations with this or similar problems will be handled by omitting them from the 
sample.  Finally, state and federal checkoffs are defined by the same five attributes and 
differentiated with a dummy variable, this means that data from both choice experiments 
are pooled.  Sample size reports will be given in terms of total responses rather than 
number of surveys, and are not representative of the number of completed surveys 
divided by two, since some respondents complete one choice experiment and not the 
other. 
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Table 5. Linear Utility Model 
 Uncalibrated  Calibrated  Uncalibrated Calibrated 
  Model   Model    Model  Model 
Parameter Estimate                                                 
(t-statistic) 
Federal Checkoff State-Level Checkoff 
Fee  -0.8520*** 
(-6.0663) 
 -0.7249*** 
(-4.7297) 
Fee  -1.2510*** 
(-8.4625) 
 -0.9217***      
(-5.6205) 
Adv  1.5603***   
(5.6289) 
 0.5611* 
(1.8501) 
Adv 1.7201***        
(5.9138) 
0.4158              
(1.3144) 
Rsrch  -0.3195 
(-0.9277) 
 -1.4933***    
(-3.6854) 
Rsrch 0.7448***        
(2.5405) 
 -0.5244            
(-1.5920) 
Other  -0.5157      
(-1.5317) 
 -1.2297          
(-0.33304) 
Other  -0.3047            
(-1.1011) 
 -1.7891***      
(-5.4571) 
MPR 
 
 
 0.6972*** 
(2.5869) 
 
 0.6668**       
(2.2547) 
 
MPR 
 
 
0.4251              
(1.5817) 
 
0.7715***        
(2.4829) 
 
*, **,*** Indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance. 
Log likelihood function value; –1294.5 (uncalibrated) and -1,159.4 (calibrated). 
Sample size: 1278 (uncalibrated) and 1259 (calibrated). 
Notes: See page 59, equation (2) for explanation of these parameters. 
 
Table 5 provides linear parameter estimates from a conditional logit model.  From 
these parameters, preferences for checkoff attributes are revealed.  Signs reveal whether 
an attribute is viewed positively or negatively, and magnitude reveals the importance 
placed on each attribute in comparison to other attributes. 
In a national checkoff, at least over some range, fee is viewed as a cost, and any 
increase would, other things constant, reduce utility.  The use of a MPR should increase 
participation in a federal checkoff.  The MPR parameter is significant and positive in 
both calibrated and uncalibrated models.  However, because the parameter is less than 
one, increasing MPR by one will increase expected participation by less than one.  This 
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will push a checkoff closer to the threshold of its provision points mechanism (PPM), and 
the trigger of a refund. 
 Still discussing a national program, how are the expenditure allocation parameters 
to be interpreted?  Because these three expenditure options are related such that 
1Adv Rsrch Other+ + = , the parameter estimates must be interpreted jointly.  
Advertising is clearly the most preferred activity.  This parameter has the largest 
magnitude, achieves statistical significance and has positive signs in calibrated and 
uncalibrated models.  The other activities are not significant and have negative signs.  A 
limitation of the linear model is that it implies producers prefer exclusively advertising.  
This is likely not the case, and a quadratic model will begin to accommodate a mixture of 
activities, if that is indeed the preference.  For the time being, simply note that advertising 
is preferred to research and other activities, as the linear model will not accommodate 
interpretation of the joint effects of all three expenditure categories.  
In a state level utility function, the fee parameter is significant and the sign is 
again negative.  The consistent sign between state and federal models indicates that MPR 
is also regarded similarly across state and federal checkoffs.  Although the uncalibrated 
model does not have a significant MPR parameter at the presented confidence levels, it 
approaches 10% significance, and the calibrated parameter estimate does achieve 
significance.  The implication for a state checkoff using a MPR is apparently similar to 
that of a federal program. 
The expenditure mix for a state checkoff has similar implications to those drawn 
from the federal program.  Advertising appears to be the most preferred activity.  There is 
somewhat more evidence of a preference for an expenditure mix at the state level, with 
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higher statistical significance on research and other parameters.  While these and 
previous preferences are similar for both checkoffs, are preferences for state and national 
level checkoffs statistically distinguishable?  A likelihood ratio test will be used to 
investigate this. 
Setting up the test requires restricting the state parameters to equal the federal 
parameters.  The test statistic is distributed under the 2kχ  distribution, where k is the 
number of restrictions.  Under the null hypothesis, utility parameters are identical for 
state and national checkoffs.  The test is run on a calibrated model, and in both cases, the 
hypothesis is confidently rejected ( .9622p = ),with this level of certainty, preferences 
for state and federal checkoffs will be presumed to be different from here on. 15 
 Recall the hypothesis that respondents are more uncertain of their preferences for 
a state program, likely due to the fact that they have no experience with a state checkoff.  
The current checkoff has been in operation since 1987, giving producers time to develop 
preferences for a national program.  Producers should have a higher level of uncertainty 
regarding their value for a novel good.  Any voluntary checkoff has some degree of 
novelty, but a state program is more novel.  Note that table 5 provides calibrated and 
uncalibrated results.  The magnitude of the change in parameters moving from 
uncalibrated to calibrated parameter estimates should be larger if more producers indicate 
uncertainty.16  Parameter estimates should change progressively more as an increasing 
number of responses are recoded.  Indeed, a comparison of the parameter stability 
                                                 
15  This is a p-value ( 1p α= − ).  The likelihood ratio test is set up where the test statistic (LR) is a ratio 
of the value of the restricted and unrestricted log-likelihood functions respectively, with five restrictions 
(k). LR=-1,164.1/-1,159.4   The test statistic is distributed under the 2kχ .  Data are calibrated. 
16  Recall that uncertain responses were calibrated by recoding them as ‘unwilling to participate’ in a 
checkoff. 
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between parameter estimates in Table 5, moving from uncalibrated to calibrated data 
reveals an average difference at the state level almost twice that of the national program 
(.56 national, 1.06 state).  
 Quadratic terms will now be added to the model in order to allow for non-linear 
effects of checkoff attributes.  All attributes will be retained, but before moving on, note 
that fee, percent of budget spent on advertising and MPR seem especially important in 
explaining willingness-to-donate. 
Non-Linear Utility: A Quadratic Model 
 While a quadratic utility model is more difficult to interpret, its flexibility allows 
a more accurate depiction of preferences.  Table 6 provides parameter estimates from a 
quadratic model. 
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Table 6. Quadratic Model Conditional Logit Parameter Estimates 
  
Uncalibrated 
Model  
Calibrated 
Model  
Uncalibrated
Model  
Calibrated 
Model 
    
  
Parameter Estimate           
(t-statistic)   
Parameter Estimate           
(t-statistic) 
 Federal Checkoff  State Checkoff 
 1.3447**  2.1299***  1.0423  2.1408** Fee 
(1.9927) (2.7993) 
Fee 
(1.5259) (2.6038) 
 -1.1149***  -1.4567***  -1.55***  -1.5559*** Fee^2 
(-3.3453) (-3.8187) 
Fee^2 
(-3.4323) (-3.7407) 
0.558  -1.0983  1.1612  -0.4975 Adv 
(0.3829) (-0.6387) 
Adv 
(1.4062) (-0.4935) 
 -1.9799  -1.7115  -1.3015  -0.966 Adv^2 
(-1.1074) (-0.8263) 
Adv^2 
(-1.3298) (-0.7846) 
-0.4084  -3.0718*  -0.5634  -3.1036*** Rsrch 
(- .3760) (-1.8447) 
Rsrch 
(-0.5892) (-2.9289) 
-2.8853*  -1.3762  -0.5967  1.1351 Rsrch^2 
(1.6889) (-0.5432) 
Rsrch^2
(-0.4657) (0.8086) 
 1.2632  0.9237  0.9598  -0.1644 Other 
(0.8776) (0.5183) 
Other 
(0.8897) (-0.1526) 
 -4.9057***  -5.9664***  -3.5236***  -4.1592*** Other^2 
(-2.6802) (-2.6154) 
Other^2
(-2.5387) (-3.0509) 
 2.5129**  3.3337***  1.1919  0.8782 MPR 
(2.3301) (2.6294) 
MPR 
(1.3439) (0.9565) 
 -1.8019*  -2.6518** -0.8313  -0.1599 MPR^2 
 
 
(-1.6489) 
 
 
(-2.0907) 
 
 
MPR^2
 
 
(-0.9204) 
 
 
(-0.1728) 
 
 
*, **,*** Indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
Log likelihood function value; –1269.5 (uncalibrated) and -1,132.9 (calibrated). 
Sample size: 1278 (uncalibrated) and 1259 (calibrated). 
Notes: See page 61, equation (5) for an explanation of these parameters.  
 
 Fee and MPR across both models exhibit diminishing marginal utility.  Utility 
increases, reaches a maximum and then decreases as a result of increasing these 
attributes.  Note that the linear and quadratic term on a variable must be interpreted as a 
pair.  For example, the linear term on fee has now changed from negative to positive, this 
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does not imply that producers now view fee as an investment rather than a cost (as in the 
linear model).  Rather, the linear and quadratic term must be interpreted jointly, revealing 
that over some range of fee, producers view the checkoff as an investment, but above this 
level, marginal utility from a higher fee no longer exceeds the marginal benefit derived 
from giving up more money.  Because utility in this model is not cardinal, signs have 
meaning, as do the differences in the magnitude between parameters; however, the 
parameters themselves do not have any real interpretation.  The linear model 
demonstrated that these attributes are important in both a state and federal checkoff; the 
quadratic model reveals that the optimal level for these two attributes are interior 
solutions. 
The budget allocation is difficult to interpret in a quadratic model.  Advertising is 
known to be the top priority in either checkoff.  The quadratic model can be used to 
interpret preferences for expenditure allocation, and more accurately reflects the fact that 
producers prefer some of each activity.  However there is a problem in doing so because 
of the relationship between the three activities (advertising+research+other = 1).  The 
quadratic utility model will accommodate this relationship but is not per se constrained to 
to do so, and so there is a need for further modeling, which the next section proceeds to 
do. 
 The utility functions presented have provided preference data.  Parameters in 
these models reveal whether a checkoff attribute is viewed positively or negatively and 
how important each is relative to the other attributes.  To obtain these parameter 
estimates, a log-likelihood function was maximized, resulting in the functions presented 
above.  However, what the models yield are parameters, not optimal attribute levels.  To 
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extrapolate optimal attribute levels for a checkoff, a utility maximization problem will be 
solved.  Maximizing the utility function is accomplished by changing the levels of 
checkoff attributes subject to the relevant constraints. 
 Optimal Checkoffs 
 The utility maximizing checkoff is solved for using the EXCEL Solver program 
and the quadratic functional form shown above.  Recall the three constraints needed to 
design a checkoff.  (1) Advertising, research and other must sum to one;  (2) The 
attributes of any checkoff must be non-negative and (3) MPR must be met, and should be 
exceeded by more than 20% to provide a margin of safety (Norwood 2004).  The 
maximized utility function also provides an estimated participation rate.  Table 7 gives 
optimal state and national checkoffs. 
Table 7. Utility Maximizing Checkoff Design 
Nationwide Checkoff 
Uncalibrated  Calibrated 
Fee per head  $   0.60  Fee per head $   0.73 
% Budget Advertising 52.4% % Budget Advertising 61.2%
% Budget Research 19.2% % Budget Research 4.4%
% Budget Other 28.3% % Budget Other 34.5%
MPR 47.2% MPR 14.9%
Predicted Participation 67.2%      Predicted Participation 34.9% 
Oklahoma Checkoff 
Fee per head $   0.45  Fee per head $   0.69 
% Budget Advertising 69.7% % Budget Advertising 77.9%
% Budget Research 7.5% % Budget Research 0.0%
% Budget Other 22.9% % Budget Other 22.1%
MPR 48.7% MPR 23.0%
Predicted Participation 68.7%       Predicted Participation 43.0% 
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 The budget for a national program should be focused primarily towards 
advertising.  Recall that in the national choice experiment, the budget allocation in one of 
the checkoffs was the same as the 2004 allocation.  Note the similarity of the optimal 
national checkoff to the status-quo option presented in the choice experiment.  The status 
quo option, with an expenditure allocation of 53:10:37, was selected in far higher 
frequency than the other options (284 times vs. 152 times). 
Preferences at the state level are for an even larger percentage of the budget to be 
directed towards advertising.  This is a surprising result that indicates producers do not 
perceive a free rider problem on advertising by out of state producers, or at least do not 
perceive advertising to be more susceptible than research and other activities.  Producers 
may assume that other states would enact similar programs. 
These checkoffs are utility and participation maximizing, based on the assumed 
producer preferences, however, there are other considerations and objectives that may be 
preferable to checkoff administrators.  Consider the use of a MPR.  Employing the MPR 
should increase participation, but the mechanism carries with it the risk of triggering a 
refund, even if the 20% margin of safety is incorporated in checkoff design. 
Table 8. Participation in Checkoffs Where MPR = 0 
Participation (Uncalibrated / Calibrated) 
Nationwide Checkoff  Oklahoma Checkoff 
      
Optimal Design 67% / 35% Optimal Design 69% / 43% 
MPR=0  48% / 26% MPR=0 60% / 38% 
Notes:  checkoffs designed where MPR is constrained to zero, using a 
quadratic utility function.  The expenditure allocation and fees are not 
presented, as they do not differ from the utility maximizing solution. 
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There are clearly reductions in the expected participation rates for both checkoffs as a 
result of not using a MPR.  However, the reduction is small and checkoff administrators 
may view the reduction as a small price to pay for a state checkoff. 
Restricting MPR to zero decreases participation, but the objective remains 
maximizing producer utility, and thus participation in a checkoff.  Maximizing 
participation is not the only objective that administrators may consider.  The level at 
which fee is set has as much to do with total revenues as the number of individuals who 
donate, thus maximizing participation is not equivalent to maximizing revenue. 
Beyond Utility Maximization 
Let us now move into designing checkoffs that consider the risk associated with 
MPR and have the objective of maximizing revenue.  This would be a checkoff 
administrator preferred objective.  To incorporate not using a MPR, the utility function is 
constrained where MPR = 0, as before.  Revenue maximization requires more 
manipulation of the model.  Let the revenue generated by a checkoff be 
(13)                                      
1
* *
N
i i
i
revenue Fee Q P
=
= ∑  
where Qi is the quantity of cattle sold by producer i and Pi is the probability of producer i  
participating in a checkoff.17  Consider the relationship between Pi and Qi.  Assume 
cov( , ) 0i iP Q = .  This implies that 0iQFee
∂ =∂ , or in words, that the probability of donation 
does not change as producer i sells more cattle; this assumption is justified in a 
subsequent section of this chapter.  With this assumption, (13) is the same for any Q, so 
we can normalize Qi to equal one. 
                                                 
17 Participation is defined in Chapter Four (pages 62 and 64). 
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(14)                                         
1
*
N
i
i
revenue Fee P
=
= ∑  
The programming problem used to solve for a revenue maximizing checkoff maximizes 
(14) under a quadratic utility model subject to relevant constraints that were previously 
developed.  The EXCEL Solver feature was used to solve the model. 
Table 9 provides revenue maximizing checkoffs which are also constrained where 
MPR = 0.  These checkoffs would be preferred by checkoff administrators, but are not 
the most preferred option to producers. 
Table 9. Revenue Maximizing Checkoffs 
(Uncalibrated / Calibrated) 
Nationwide Checkoff  Oklahoma Checkoff 
       
Utility Maximization  
Participation 
Fee 
 
    67% / 35% 
  $.60 / $.73 
Utility Maximization  
Participation 
Fee 
 
    69% / 43% 
  $.45 / $.69 
Revenue Maximization 
Participation
Fee
 
    38% / 22% 
  $1.21 / $1.12 
Revenue Maximization 
Participation 
Fee 
 
    46% / 32% 
  $1.15 / $1.11 
 
Notes: checkoffs designed to reduce the risk associated with using the provision 
points mechanism (MPR=0), and to maximize revenue rather than utility.  The 
expenditure allocations are not presented, as they do not differ from those presented 
under utility maximization. 
 
A fee increase above the utility maximizing levels will clearly decrease participation.  
However, checkoff administrators may prefer more money to more individuals 
participating, making revenue maximization preferable to utility maximization. 
The next section will incorporate demographics into these results in order to more 
accurately infer preferences for other producers across the state and nation, and explain 
some of the attitudes that correlate with willingness to donate. 
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Demographics 
 There may be differences in willingness-to-donate according to farm type or size, 
by membership in a certain group or by household income.  Recall that the fixed effects 
of demographics may be measured using dummy variables.  As an example, consider the 
inclusion of a dummy variable to examine the effect of being a veal producer.  This 
variable would take a value of one if a respondent indicated they produced veal calves 
and zero otherwise.  If the parameter is negative, veal producers experience less utility for 
a checkoff than their counterparts.  If willingness-to-donate is heterogeneous by 
demographic group, conclusions about the behavior of the population must be adjusted to 
reflect differences before the ‘best’ result can be obtained. 
 A dummy variable indicates two things regarding utility for a checkoff.  The sign 
indicates whether a given group derives higher or lower utility, and the magnitude 
indicates the extent of the difference relative to other factors.18  Parameter estimates that 
are statistically indistinguishable from zero do not imply that the probability of 
participation for that group is zero.  Rather, this result implies that the preferences do not 
differ from the survey average.  Attitudinal data are incorporated using the same 
methodology.  Although the implications of the two classes of data are different, both 
measure fixed effects, and are measured the same way. 
This section investigates demographic data, while the following section is devoted 
to attitudinal data.  In each case, the demographic or attitude is first described, and then 
the feature is inserted into the linear utility function shown in Chapter Four (equation (2), 
                                                 
18 Other factors could be checkoff attributes, attitudinal effects or additional demographic categories. 
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page 59) using dummy variables.19  Note that in measuring the effects of demographics 
and attitudes, the best that we can reliably count on is measuring correlation with utility.  
Causation of utility for a checkoff is not a knowable function using the methods of this 
study.  Because the objective is correlation, demographics and attitudes were isolated and 
studied individually.  For example in studying farm size, relevant farm size dummy 
variables were defined and specified in a linear utility function.  To study a different 
category of dummy variables, say income, the size dummy variables were dropped, and 
the linear utility function respecified using only the income dummy variables and the 
linear attribute variables from Table 5.  In the same way, remaining demographics and 
attitudes were studied.  In each case, results are presented without attribute parameters 
(fee, adv, rsrch, other and MPR), although they were included in the estimation.  
Although the attribute parameters are not constant in each case, the results proved to be 
robust in each specification and the implications of the attribute parameters did not 
change as different dummy variable groups were included in the utility function.  Finally, 
all data in the next two sections were calibrated and some surveys have been dropped 
from the sample to handle missing data.  Table 10 presents descriptions of all 
demographic dummy variables that will be covered in this section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Also see Table 5, page 69. 
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Table 10. Demographic Dummy Variables  
Survey Question Variable Name   Description 
Please indicate the average 
number of cattle and calves 
you sell each year 
Veal Calves  1 if veal calves are produced, 0 
otherwise 
Calf, Feeder, Purebred  
  
1 if weaned calves, feeder cattle or 
purebred cattle are produced, 0 
otherwise 
 Small  
 
 
1 if producer sells 50 or fewer 
weaned calves or purebred cattle, 0 
otherwise 
 Large  
  
  
1 if producer sells more than the 
non-zero survey average number of 
fed cattle, weaned calves or stockers, 
0 otherwise 
 Small Farm Large Income  
 
 
1 if a producer is small (as above) 
and has an income greater than 
$80,000, 0 otherwise 
     
Please check any farm 
organizations in which you 
are a member 
Cattleman’s Association  1 if a producer is a member of the 
National or Oklahoma Cattleman’s 
Association, 0 otherwise 
 R-CALF  1 if a producer is a member of R-CALF, 0 otherwise 
 NFU  
  
1 if a producer is a member of 
National Farmers Union, 0 otherwise
 OK Farm Bureau  
  
1 if a producer is a member of OK 
Farm Bureau, 0 otherwise 
 National Farm Bureau  
  
1 if a producer is a member of the 
National Farm Bureau, 0 otherwise 
     
Please estimate your 
household’s yearly income 
before taxes… 
$20,000-$39,999  1 if a producer has an income in this 
range, 0 otherwise 
$40,000-$59,999  1 if a producer has an income in this 
range, 0 otherwise  $60,000-$79,999  1 if a producer has an income in this 
range, 0 otherwise 
 
$80,000+  1 if a producer has an income in this 
range, 0 otherwise 
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Type of Cattle Raised 
 The first demographic question asked producers to indicate how many and what 
type of cattle they sold in a typical year.  Recall the distribution of cattle ownership 
presented previously in Chapter Two and again here for emphasis on the differences 
encountered in the survey across farm type and size. 
Table 11. Survey Cattle Ownership by Type and Size 
       Weaned    
        Calves    Feeder Cattle         Fed Cattle     Veal Calves 
     Purebred   
      Animals 
Range n Range n Range n Range n Range n 
0 106 0 168 0 425 0 561 0 478
<50 170 <100 175 <500 132 <50 41 <50 114
50-99 156 100-499 133 500-999 33 50-99 6 50-99 18
100-199 71 500-999 85 1000-9999 21 100-199 3 100-199 13
200-499 89 1000-4999 70 10,000-19,999 2 200-499 2 200-499 2 
500≥  63 5000≥  12 20, 000≥  7 500≥  0 500≥  0 
Notes:  Responses to question regarding farm size and type.  The range column is the 
interval offered as a potential response.  The n column reflects how many producers 
indicated they sold a particular type and number of cattle.  For example: 106 producers 
indicated they sold 0 Weaned Calves. 
 
Also recall that there are differences in capital allocation and production goals between 
producer types.  There is reason to suspect that these differences may change the 
propensity to donate by type of cattle produced.  Some types of producers may tend to 
feel that their segment of the industry does or does not benefit from checkoff activities, 
creating a need to have individual representation in the model because of the differences 
in utility for a checkoff by group.  However, in some cases producers may be involved 
with more than one type of production causing problems identifying and isolating groups 
of producers. 
So what is the most appropriate way to group cattle producers?  Purebred cattle, 
feeder cattle and weaned calf producers are the most likely groups to be under single 
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ownership.  As a result these three producer types are grouped together as one.  The three 
cattle type groups are: fed cattle producers, veal producers; and calf, stocker and feeder 
cattle producers jointly.  Recall that surveys were only sent to Oklahoma cattle producers.  
Assuming that all respondents did in fact produce cattle in at least one of the classes 
presented, including all three farm type categories would result in a perfect linear 
combination.  Dropping one class of cattle from the utility function creates a reference 
group and solves the problem.  Fed cattle will be the group that is dropped.  Remaining 
parameter estimates indicate the difference in utility that a given group experiences as 
compared to fed cattle producers. 
Table 12. Cattle Type Sold 
Parameter Estimates for Cattle Type Sold 
Linear Model (t-statistic) 
Veal Calves Calf, Feeder, Purebred a  
-0.7382*** -0.339 
               (-3.003)                    (-0.7655) 
*, **, *** Denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
Log likelihood function value; –1,154.2; sample size = 1259. 
Notes:  These parameter estimates were obtained from the linear utility 
function presented in Table 5.  The model was specified as follows 
1 2(1 ) ( ) , ,ij ij i ij i i i iU X B F X B F VealCalves Calf Feeder Purebred ε= − + + + +
The checkoff attribute parameters have been omitted from this table for 
ease of presentation.  While attribute parameters change slightly, the 
model is still robust in this specification, and the implications for 
checkoff design remain the same.  The reference group is fed cattle 
a Specification of a parameter for each of these cattle types individually 
produced no individually significant parameters. 
 
 
While the calf, feeder, purebred group appears similar to fed cattle producers with 
respect to preferences for a checkoff, these results do not definitively imply that the calf, 
feeder, purebred group is distinct from the veal calves producer group.  Nonetheless, as 
far as difference from fed cattle producers, in veal producers, the first and only notable 
difference by producer type is encountered.  Veal producers are less likely to donate to a 
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checkoff than fed cattle producers.  Perhaps veal producers perceive that their product is 
dissimilar enough to beef as to not enjoy the benefits of the marketing activities 
undertaken by a checkoff.  In states that have more dairies there may be different 
preferences due to the fact that veal is typically a by-product of dairy production.  The 
beef checkoff clearly does not promote dairy consumption.  However, an insufficient 
response was received to draw any conclusions about this possibility, as only four 
respondents produced strictly dairy animals.  What about farm size, do large producers 
experience some different level of utility than small producers? 
Size 
Since respondents were asked what type and how many of each cattle type they 
sold, the same question used to address farm type will be used to address farm size.  
There are two issues of interest to administrators regarding farm size.  Does farm size 
correlate with different willingness-to-donate?  Do the joint effects of farm size and 
income effect willingness-to-donate? 
Small producers will be defined as having indicated that they sold the number of 
cattle in the smallest range of cattle.  There is again a potential problem with producers 
who sell more than one type of cattle.  For example, a producer could sell 500 weaned 
calves in a year, while retaining ownership on 25 of them as feeders.  This producer 
would appear to be a small feeder calf producer but would actually be more correctly 
described as a large weaned calf producer.  How is the effect of being a small producer to 
be measured? 
To answer this question, consider again the beef industry.  Finishing cattle 
involves large cattle numbers of cattle.  Large commercial feedlots (defined by NASS as 
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having capacity over 1000 head) commonly have tens of thousands of cattle at any given 
time.  The entire state of Oklahoma has 24 commercial feedlots (Bloyd).20  As a result 
measuring the effect of being a small cattle feeder based upon this survey response is not 
feasible, since there are not a sufficient number of large feedlots to compare.  Feeder 
cattle are typically found in rather large groups (recall the average number sold by survey 
respondents is 696) and will not be used to measure small producer effects.  Veal 
producers have already been shown to have different preferences for a checkoff and the 
collinear effects of size and type could not be separated based on available data.  Small 
producers then will be defined as producers who sell less than 50 weaned calves or 
purebred animals. 
Let us now define a large producer.  Note that a large producer can be involved in 
more than one type of production without creating the definitional problems encountered 
in the same scenario for a small producer.  For example, a cattle feeder who sells 75,000 
head of cattle may also sell 30 weaned calves in a year.  The fact that he sells 30 weaned 
calves does not make him a small producer, and his behavior would likely be more 
similar to peers who are in the type of production in which he is a large producer.  A 
large producer is to be identified as producing more than the survey average number of 
fed cattle, weaned calves or stockers.  Veal will be excluded because only 11 veal 
producers meet the criteria to be large, and again because of multicollinearity problems.  
                                                 
20 Note that there were 30 producers who indicated that they typically sold more than 1000 head of fed 
cattle.  All cattle producers pay checkoff fees, but this exemplifies a definitional problem with 
independently modeling the effect of being a fed cattle producer.  Some producers produce weaned calves 
or stocker animals and then pay a feedlot to finish the animals rather than selling them to the feedlot.  These 
people may indicate that they sell fed cattle, but are more accurately described as weaned calf or stocker 
producers since they do not undertake any feeding activities. 
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Purebred producers will be excluded as well because this type of producer is generally 
smaller on average. 
What are the average numbers of cattle produced by survey respondents?  A 
method to estimate averages was presented in Chapter Three.21  Those figures were 
calculated by incorporating into the average, those producers who did not produce any of 
a certain type of cattle.  For the purpose of identifying and comparing producers within a 
certain group, it is more accurate to take an average number of cattle sold based only 
upon producers who actually produce that type of cattle.  Table 13 presents both 
averages. 
Table 13. Non-Zero Cattle Averages 
 Calves Feeder Fed Veal Purebred 
Including producers 
with zero values 
of cattle types 
160 696 610 5 11 
Not including 
producers 
with zero values 
of cattle types 
191 942 1940 59 47 
Notes:  Average number of cattle sold in each of the five possible types.  
Results presented for two methods of calculating producer averages (1) 
including producers who indicate a zero value for a cattle type, and (2) 
by excluding producers who indicate a zero value for a cattle type. 
 
One question remains relative to farm size:  What of the relationship between 
income and farm size?  Recall the diversity of people in beef production highlighted 
earlier.  Some producers may enter the beef industry for enjoyment rather than for profit.  
These people likely have a majority of their household revenue generated off the farm, 
and may only be mildly concerned with profit.  A producer of this kind would seem 
likely to have a smaller farm than other producers who must produce positive returns and 
                                                 
21 See page 33, Figure 3. 
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support a family.  This phenomenon will be tested on weaned calf producers and feeder 
calf producers (the same way small producers were defined earlier).  A dummy variable 
that takes a value of one if a “small” producer in either of these categories has an income 
in the largest bracket ($80,000 +) and zero otherwise is created.  Theory does not firmly 
establish a sign expectation for this variable, and either is acceptable and explainable. 
Table 14. Farm Size Effects 
Parameter Estimates for Size 
Linear Model (t-statistic) 
Small Producer 
(n=300) 
Large Producer 
(n=266) 
Small Farm Large Income 
(n=76) 
-0.2331  0.0307 0.0877 
(-1.6192) (0.2306) (0.3862) 
*, **, *** Denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
Log-likelihood function value; -1,157.6, sample size = 1259. 
Notes:  These parameter estimates were obtained from the linear utility function 
presented in Table 5.  The model was specified as follows 
1 2(1 ) ( ) ...ij ij i ij i i i
i i
U X B F X B F SmallProducer LargeProducer
SmallFarmLargeIncome ε
= − + + + +
+  
The checkoff attribute parameters have been omitted from this table for ease of 
presentation.  While attribute parameters change slightly, the model is still robust 
in this specification, and the implications for checkoff design remain the same.  
No reference group is needed, as the variables are not exhaustive. 
 
Small producers do not seem to have preferences that differ from their larger 
peers.  The sign is negative on small producer and consistent with the hypothesis that 
small producers may derive less benefit because of their smaller stake in the industry.  
However, the level of significance is not above 10% and does not lend to a strong 
endorsement of this theory.  There is no significant change in propensity to donate as a 
result of being a large producer either.  Consider the implication of a significant large or 
small producer parameter.  The checkoff functions on a per head fee, thus if large 
producers were more likely to donate, a checkoff could expect a higher level of funding 
than if an equal likelihood among small producers were observed.  In other words, size is 
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important because larger producers have a more significant effect on revenue than small 
producers. 
As with the other size variables, the small producer large income variable does 
not achieve statistical significance different than zero.  Thus far, none of the size or farm 
type variables, excepting veal calf producers, have proven to correlate with preferences 
for a checkoff.  However, two demographic categories remain to be investigated.  
Membership in farm groups and the effects of different household incomes will be 
presented the next two sections. 
Group Membership  
 Recall the varied official positions of the groups that were presented on the 
survey.  Do individuals follow the position of the groups in which they claim 
membership?  Evidence will be examined by observing propensity to donate to a 
checkoff, and comparing this to the formal position adopted by each group.  All groups 
were examined individually with the exception of the Oklahoma Cattleman’s Association 
(OCA) and the National Cattleman’s Association (NCBA).  These two groups are closely 
tied, with similar positions on many issues. 
 In the case of cattle type sold it was necessary to drop one category in order to 
avoid creating a series of variables that were a perfect linear combination.  Should the 
same be done for group membership?  The answer is no for the reason that an exhaustive 
set of groups was not included in the choice set.  Recall that a write-in option was 
provided to allow respondents to indicate membership in other groups.  There were 197 
people who either wrote in a group or indicated no group; this is a sufficient number of 
respondents to create a reference group.  Interpretation of remaining parameters is the 
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difference in utility experienced by members of a group from write-ins or non-group 
members. 
If a matrix containing all group variables exhibits full rank, then all group dummy 
variables may be used.  In order for data to have full rank, each variable should be 
linearly independent of the others.  The rank function in MATLAB confirms that all five 
group dummy variables are linearly independent of each other.22 
Table 15. Group Membership Effects 
Parameter Estimates for Group Membership   
Linear Model (t-statistic)   
Cattleman’s Association 
(OK and National) R-CALF 
National Farmers 
Union 
OK Farm 
Bureau 
National Farm 
Bureau 
0.3916*** 0.3492 -0.0438 0.0238 0.5079** 
           (3.2577) (1.0334) (-0.2194) (0.1977)    (2.0212) 
*, **, *** Denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
Log-likelihood function value; –1,149.6, sample size = 1259. 
Notes:  These parameter estimates were obtained from the linear utility function 
presented in Table 5.  The model was specified as follows 
1 2(1 ) ( )ij ij i ij i i i i i i iU X B F X B F Cattlemans RCALF NFU OFBA NFB ε= − + + + + + + +  
The checkoff attribute parameters have been omitted from this table for ease of 
presentation.  While attribute parameters change slightly, the model is still robust in this 
specification, and the implications for checkoff design remain the same.  A reference 
group is not required as the write-in category, allows other groups to be represented.  
There were 197 of 705 respondents who either did not indicate group affiliation or wrote 
in another group. 
 
Consider the interpretation of these group parameters.  If a group parameter is 
significant, then members of that group would be more or less likely to donate to 
according to a positive or negative sign respectively.  Some groups are much larger than 
others, NCBA has over 200,000 members and R-CALF has about 10,000 (NCBA; R-
CALF), and thus the impact of group membership on revenues varies broadly.  Finally, 
                                                 
22 There are actually six groups in the survey but OCA and NCBA were grouped together as described 
previously. 
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note that insignificant parameters reveal that members in a group have preferences equal 
to the survey average, not that they prefer a refund 
The official position of NFU is one in favor of a voluntary checkoff.  Membership 
in NFU does not increase the likelihood that a producer favors a checkoff.  R-CALF takes 
no official position in the checkoff debate, and the model implies no difference in 
propensity to donate.  Membership in Oklahoma Farm Bureau (OFB) was the largest of 
all six groups with half of all respondents indicating membership.  OFB member’s 
propensity to donate to a checkoff does not depart from the average.  Consider the 
position of OFB, a farm group not specific to the beef industry, which states “We support 
a $.50 / head Oklahoma Beef Checkoff in the event that a national checkoff is defeated.”  
It seems as though the position of OFB is consistent with the results of the survey.  
Somewhere between 43% and 69% of producers favor a state checkoff with the utility 
maximizing fee in the range of $.45 - $.69. 
 What of the groups who derive a statistically different level of utility?  Consider 
again OCA and NCBA, groups whose specific focus is the beef industry, taking note of 
the positive and significant result in Table 15.  The formal position taken by these groups 
is one in favor of the current program.  Further, NCBA receives funding from the 
checkoff and their interest in the continuation of the mandatory checkoff is not surprising.  
One would expect that a voluntary checkoff would be a second choice to the mandatory 
version, but preferred over nothing.  Producers in the cattleman’s associations do indeed 
seem to favor a checkoff.  A positive and significant parameter reveals that members of 
these two groups prefer a checkoff to a greater extent than their non-member peers, 
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suggesting greater participation from members of the Oklahoma Cattleman’s and 
National Cattleman’s Beef Association. 
 NFB opposes the elimination of the checkoff and based on results, favors the 
development of a voluntary checkoff as a replacement.  There were 43 producers who 
indicated membership with NFB and a significant and positive parameter estimate 
demonstrates a higher than average willingness-to-donate for members of the National 
Farm Bureau. 
Of the groups that were studied, none were found to derive less utility from a 
checkoff than the survey average.  These data may be used to aid program administrators 
in targeting a checkoff, either trying to motivate those groups already more likely to 
participate or by appealing to those who are not as likely to do so, in an attempt to win 
additional support.  Let us now consider the effect of income on checkoff preferences. 
Household Income 
 The final demographic to be considered is income.  There are several ways to 
look at income given how the question was delivered on the survey.  Raw numbers could 
be used, as was the case with checkoff attributes.  Because data on income are in five 
ranges, using raw numbers requires the use of midpoints for the three closed intervals and 
a guess for the open intervals at the extremes of the question.  Especially at the highest 
level of income, this is not a particularly accurate representation. 
Another way to represent income is with categorical variables.  Under this option, 
a number is assigned to represent an income interval.  For example, if a producer 
indicated their income was “less than $20,000,” a categorical variable taking a value of 
one would be assigned.  If the next producer indicated their income was in the range of 
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$20,000-$39,000, a categorical variable with a value of two would be assigned.  There 
were five income intervals, and thus the same trend would continue for categorical 
variables taking values of three, four and five for the next ranges of incomes.  This 
approach, like the raw income method above, has the advantage of not giving up degrees 
of freedom by having multiple dummy variables.  The use of a quadratic term on this 
variable will also allow for non-linearity of income effects. 
Yet another method would be use of a series of dummy variables.  These dummy 
variables would take a value of one for responses indicating a particular income range 
and zero otherwise.  Both the categorical variable and a dummy variable series were 
implemented, but in the end the dummy series is preferred.  A dummy variable series has 
the advantage of being a theoretically more robust result, because it accurately represents 
the method in which data were collected from the survey. 
Recall that an intercept is not incorporated into the model.  This should allow for 
all income dummy variables to be included in the model.  However, interpretation of a 
regression with all dummy variables becomes somewhat problematic.  All producers have 
an income.  Given that all but 40 respondents chose to provide their income, the entire set 
of dummies will essentially reflect willingness-to-participate as a result of having an 
income.  If an income category is omitted, the result is the creation of a reference group 
with a difference in willingness-to-participate equal to the survey average.  What of a 
statistical test for this hypothesis?  A likelihood ratio test of the restriction that        
income <$20,000 (the lowest income dummy variable) is equal to zero cannot be rejected 
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at any standard level of significance ( .3162p = ).23  The interpretation of the remaining 
parameter estimates is the difference in willingness-to-donate attributable to changing 
levels of income relative, to the lowest level. 
Table 16. Income Effects 
Parameter Estimates for Household Income  
Linear Model (t-statistic)     
$ 20,000 - 39,000 $ 40,000 - 49,000 $ 50,000 - 79,000 $ 80,000 + 
0.8441*** 1.4458*** 1.2161*** 1.3098*** 
           (2.9958)        (5.2623)            (4.2991)     (4.9453) 
*, **, *** Denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1%  
Log-likelihood function value; –1140.9, sample size = 1259. 
Notes:  The ranges of incomes are given here, as on the survey question asking 
respondents to indicate their household income.  These parameter estimates were 
obtained from the linear utility function presented in Table 5.  The model was specified 
as follows 
1 2(1 ) ( ) 20 39 40 49 50 79 80 _ij ij i ij i i i i i iU X B F X B F to k to k to k k plus ε= − + + + + + +  
The checkoff attribute parameters have been omitted from this table for ease of 
presentation.  While attribute parameters change slightly, the model is still robust in this 
specification, and the implications for checkoff design remain the same.  The reference 
group is income <$20,000. 
 
 
Notice that willingness-to-donate increases and then plateaus.  Somewhere in the 
range of $40,000 to $49,000, willingness-to-donate becomes approximately constant.  
The average farm income in the U.S. is approximately $67,000.  This implies that 
checkoff design need not be particularly concerned with targeting the program towards 
any particular income demographic.  Those producers that derive relatively less utility 
from a checkoff are well below the average farm income.  It seems probable that, other 
things constant, larger income implies larger farms (more cattle) and thus higher potential 
                                                 
23 This is a p-value ( 1p α= − ).  The likelihood ratio test is set up where the test statistic (LR) is a ratio of 
the value of the restricted and unrestricted log-likelihood function values respectively, with one restriction 
(k) LR=-1,140.9/-1,135.5 .  The test statistic is distributed under the 2kχ .  Data are calibrated. 
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donations to a checkoff.  The categorical variable approach was also used, however 
results are not presented.24 
Estimates of participation for several checkoff designs have been given.  It is 
further shown that several demographic segments have different propensities to donate.  
Next, let us now address the effects of attitude on willingness-to-donate. 
Attitudes 
Producers were asked to answer questions regarding their feelings toward the 
current checkoff.  These questions allow for comparison of the current checkoff to a 
replacement program.  For example, if a voluntary program is treated as a substitute for a 
mandatory checkoff, producers who favor the current program should be more likely to 
participate in a voluntary program.  Another type of attitude question addresses perceived 
benefit allocation to producers from checkoff activities, and may aid checkoff 
administrators in allocating funds.  Consider an attitude that research from the checkoff 
benefits producers more than processors and retailers (not an actual result).  Checkoff 
administrators would have good reason to consider the inclusion of at least some research 
in a checkoff.  This section considers these and other attitudes.  First, take note of Table 
17, which describes the construction of each variable in this section. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Incorporating the categorical variables income and income2 rather than a series of dummy variables 
imposes a continuous structure on income as would be more realistic.  The result of this approach points to 
a similar point at which utility reaches a maximum.  However, further interpretation of the categorical 
income variable will not allow for the plateau effect that is observed in the dummy variable series, 
implying that producers at even higher levels of income would experience increasingly lower utility.  This 
is problematic and unlikely.  Especially given the relatively low maximum income level of $80,000, the 
survey question simply does not contain enough information to accept this implication.  
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Table 17. Attitudinal Dummy Variables 
Survey Question Variable Name  Description 
Aware  
  
  
1 if the respondent was 
aware of the litigation, 0 
otherwise 
Were you aware of the 
recent litigation and court 
rulings on the beef 
checkoff before receiving 
this survey?  
   
    
Eliminate  
  
  
1 if the respondent 
indicated they were in favor 
of eliminating the checkoff, 
0 otherwise 
Which best describes your 
feelings toward the 
challenge to the mandatory 
beef checkoff? 
   
    
Foreign  
  
 
 
1 if the respondent 
indicated that foreign 
producers benefited equally 
or more than domestic 
producers, 0 otherwise 
How much do you feel the 
beef checkoff funds 
benefit cattle and beef 
producers outside of the 
U.S.? 
   
Advertisingatt  
  
  
Who, in your opinion 
receives the greatest 
benefit from checkoff 
funds spent on advertising? 
  
1 if the respondent 
indicated that processors 
and retailers benefited 
equally or more than 
producers from advertising, 
0 otherwise 
    
Researchatt  
  
  
Who, in your opinion 
receives the greatest 
benefit from checkoff 
funds spent on research? 
  
1 if the respondent 
indicated that processors 
and retailers benefited 
equally or more than 
producers from research, 0 
otherwise 
 
 
Litigation Awareness and Mandatory Checkoff Support 
 A court order has allowed the continued operation of the mandatory checkoff until 
a final verdict is reached.  It is likely that opinions regarding the current checkoff will 
correlate with preferences for a voluntary checkoff.  Specifically, consider awareness of 
the litigation surrounding the issue, and the opinion that the current program should be 
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eliminated.  Because these attitudes are both rooted in the current checkoff, the variables 
are grouped together and specified in a utility function as before.  Note that in each of 
these two variables, the converse opinion is not included in the utility function, as having 
one of these opinions necessarily implies not having the other.  For example, regarding 
the Aware parameter, the condition of respondents being unaware of checkoff litigation 
is not incorporated into the utility function.  Table 18 gives parameter estimates for 
dummy variables on these attitudes. 
Table 18. Mandatory Checkoff Opinion Correlations 
Parameter Estimates for Mandatory Checkoff Opinions 
Linear Model (t-statistic)   
Aware Eliminate 
0.5271*** -2.8926*** 
                   (3.934)                (-13.0131) 
*, **, *** Denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
Log-likelihood function value; –1,006.1, sample size = 1259. 
Notes:  Aware is a variable which measures the effect of being aware 
of the litigation against the checkoff.  Eliminate is a variable to 
measure the effect of being in favor of elimination of the checkoff.  
These parameter estimates were obtained from the linear utility 
function presented in Table 5.  The model was specified as follows 
1 2(1 ) ( )ij ij i ij i i i iU X B F X B F Aware Eliminate ε= − + + + +  
The checkoff attribute parameters have been omitted from this table 
for ease of presentation.  While attribute parameters change slightly, 
the model is still robust in this specification, and the implications for 
checkoff design remain the same 
 
Some producers who took the survey were not aware of the litigation against the 
program.  The producers who were aware, gained more utility from participation than 
those who were not.  Notice the positive and significant sign on Aware (Table 18).  It is 
likely that producers who are aware of the checkoff litigation, are also more active in 
obtaining other checkoff news.  Given the generally positive news delivered by the beef 
industry to its participants about checkoff effectiveness, this result is not surprising. 
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Consider the question regarding elimination of the mandatory checkoff.  It seems 
that a voluntary and mandatory checkoff are viewed as substitutes for each other.  The 
high and negative magnitude and strong significance of the Eliminate parameter indicates 
that people who favor eliminating the mandatory checkoff are less likely to participate in 
the hypothetical voluntary checkoff of the choice experiment.  Conversely, producers 
who favor keeping the checkoff are more likely to participate in a voluntary replacement.  
How much does supporting the mandatory checkoff increase the likelihood of donation? 
Still using calibrated data, but now under a quadratic functional form, let the 
dummy variable Support be the mirror image of Eliminate, taking a value of one if a 
producer indicated they supported the current checkoff, zero otherwise.  This parameter 
takes a value of 2.6302 (t=17.564).  Incorporating the parameter into the utility function 
as a binary variable reveals that having this attitude increases the likelihood of donation 
by about 44%.  The probability of participation, holding everything else constant, for 
individuals who favor the current checkoff (note these are calibrated data, on the federal 
checkoff) is 92.8%.  This result implies that producers who favor keeping the mandatory 
checkoff are significantly more likely to participate in a voluntary program.  While not a 
surprising result, this is nonetheless useful, considering the availability of support 
estimates from NCBA. 
Perceived Benefit Allocation 
 There have been several studies regarding the actual benefits of the mandatory 
checkoff.  Actual benefits of checkoff activities will have little bearing on the success or 
failure of a voluntary checkoff.  The program(s) will realize participation only if 
producers perceive that a checkoff is successful at creating benefits, there may indeed be 
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a high correlation between actual and perceived benefits, here we examine only the 
perceived benefits of research and advertising expenditures. 
 Allocation of the budget is the means by which a checkoff may change its focus.  
Two questions dealt with the most well-known and studied allocations, those being 
research and advertising.  What is the best way to make use of these questions? 
Perhaps the most communicative results in answering these questions have 
already been observed.  Recall the summary statistics regarding these two questions.  
More than half of producers felt that processors and retailers benefited equally or more 
than producers as a result of expenditures on both research and advertising.  This hints at 
market power perceptions (since processors and retailers are perceived to have the ability 
to retain the benefits from these activities).  Although this result alone is interesting, there 
may be correlations between these attitudes and checkoff preferences. 
Does it make sense to measure the effects of these attitudes using the method that 
has been implemented thus far?  Perceived benefit allocation should enter the utility 
function in attribute selection during the choice experiment.  Thus, careful consideration 
suggests a need for a new method to study these attitudes due to an expected high 
correlation with respective checkoff attributes. 
Consider a new method to measure these attitudes’ effect on producer utility.  
Specification of another utility function will accommodate analysis of the variables 
Researchatt and Advertisingatt.  Let the dummy variables Researchatt and Advertisingatt 
take values of one if a producer feels that retailers and processors benefit at least as much 
as producers as a result of the respective activity, zero otherwise. 
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Let the utility for respondent i, derived from a national checkoff be represented by 
the following. 
(15)    1 2 3 4 5( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i i iU B fee B Rsrch B Other B MPR B Advertisingatt ε= + + + + +  
Where Advertisingatt is a dummy variable as defined in Table 17, and remaining 
variables are checkoff attributes in a federal checkoff.  This model recognizes the 
relationship between the attitude measured by Advertisingatt and the parameter 
measuring preference for advertising by omitting the parameter adv.  Any lingering effect 
of preference for advertising will be deposited in εi.  Equation (15) can be used to 
estimate a participation rate for producers who have the attitude that processors and 
retailers receive at least the same level of benefits from advertising as producers 
(Advertisingatt = 1).  Where    Advertisingatt = 0, respondent i does not have this attitude.  
Since this question relates to perceptions about the national checkoff the model was 
specified using national data. 
Table 19. Advertising Benefits 
Parameter Estimates for Perceived Benefits of Advertising 
Linear Model (t-statistic) 
Fee Rsrch Other MPR Advertisingatt 
   -0.4585    -1.3948    -0.668    1.214     -0.7566 
(-3.2852)*** (-3.6617)*** (-1.8369)* (4.5737)*** (-9.4204)*** 
*,**,*** Denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1%  
Log-likelihood-function value -1255, sample size = 1259. 
Notes:  National level calibrated data were used to specify this model, 
which measures the effect of the attitude that processors and retailers 
benefit equally or more than beef producers as a result of advertising. 
Advertisingatt is a dummy variable taking a value of one if producers have 
this belief and zero otherwise. 
 
Advertisingatt has a negative sign, which implies that producers who have this 
belief would be less likely to participate in a checkoff.  Participation is expected by 23 % 
of producers who believe the benefits of advertising accrue to processors and retailers 
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equally or more than producers, while 39% of producers who do not have this attitude are 
expected to participate.  These participation rates are quite low, this is likely an indication 
of the degree to which Advertisingatt and adv are correlated.  While the two variables do 
seem to be related, it appears that there is a good deal more to preferences for advertising 
as an attribute (adv) than just the degree to which benefits accrue to producers 
(Advertisinatt).  Utility maximizing checkoff attributes for fee, rsrch, other and MPR 
were used to calculate these participation rates as defined in Chapter Four.25   
The same method may be applied to measure the effect of the attitude that the 
benefits of research accrue to processors and retailers at the same or greater level than 
they accrue to producers.  Recall that Researchatt is a dummy variable taking a value of 
one if producers have this attitude, and zero otherwise.  The utility function specified to 
measure this attitude follows. 
(16)     1 2 3 4 5( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i i iU B fee B Adv B Other B MPR B Researchatt ε= + + + + +  
Specification of this model follows the same theory and method as that for equation (15) 
and Table 19. 
Table 20. Research Benefits 
Parameter Estimates for Perceived Benefits of Research 
Linear Model (t-statistic) 
Fee Adv Other MPR Researchatt 
   -0.8491   1.3417   -0.6722      0.3631     -0.8316 
(-5.8674)*** (4.6367)*** (-1.7963)* (1.3241) (-9.6957)*** 
*,**,*** Denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
Log-likelihood-function value –1257.8, sample size = 1259. 
Notes:  National level calibrated data were used to specify this 
model, which measures the effect of the attitude that processors and 
retailers benefit equally or more than beef producers as a result of 
research.  Researchatt is a dummy variable taking a value of one if 
producers have this belief and zero otherwise. 
 
                                                 
25 See pages 62 and 64. 
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 Researchatt displays a negative sign, indicating that producers who maintain the 
belief that processors and retailers benefit equally or more that producers as a result of 
research are less likely to participate in a checkoff.  Of the producers who subscribe to 
this belief (Researchatt=1), 31% are expected to participate, for producers who do not, 
51% would likely participate. 
The perception that the benefits of advertising go to processors and retailers 
equally or more than producers decreases participation in a checkoff by 16%, whereas the 
same belief regarding research reduces participation by 20%.  Note that in both models 
calibrated data were used.  Calibrated estimates are regarded as a lower bound on all 
estimates thus far and the same interpretation applies here.  A similar question addresses 
perceptions that the benefits received by foreign producers are greater than or equal to 
those received by domestic producers. 
How do you feel the beef checkoff funds benefit cattle and beef producers outside 
of the U.S.?  This is the final attitudinal question, and the associated attitude was modeled 
individually as there are no comparable attitudes to group with.  Do producers feel that 
domestic or foreign cattle producers receive a higher level of benefit from the checkoff?  
Producers who perceive the benefits accrue more to foreign producers would have a 
lesser incentive to participate in a checkoff.  A dummy variable for producers who have 
this perception should capture this effect and have a negative sign.  The parameter on the 
variable foreign takes a value of -0.4354 and is significant at the 1% level (  t=-3.1382 ).  
However, recall that of the 24% producers possess this attitude, only 7% feel that the 
benefits received by foreigners are greater than those of domestic producers 
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Summary 
 This chapter has presented three results.  Preferences have been measured and 
used to suggest a utility maximizing checkoff along with several alternative designs.  In 
addition, demographics and attitudes have been examined for their effect on willingness-
to-donate to a checkoff.  It should be noted again that demographics and attitudes were 
studied through the use of small, related groups of dummy variables.  Appendix B 
provides a table with parameter estimates from a regression including all these dummy 
variables in one inclusive model.  The next and final section will summarize what has 
been accomplished, and offer comment on selected results. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Tensions continue to run high on both sides of the fight to preserve the mandatory 
beef checkoff.  The U.S. Supreme Court will hear an appeal to keep the program alive in 
early 2005.  Several major hurdles have already been set before the case is heard.  One 
federal appeal has been lost, and a precedent has been set in the Mushroom Checkoff 
case.  The likelihood of a ruling in favor of a continued mandatory beef checkoff appears 
small. 
 Aside from the litigation, the picture is not so dim.  There seems to be evidence 
that the checkoff provides benefits to the industry.  Several states feel the current 
checkoff is successful enough to pursue legislation establishing a voluntary beef checkoff 
if the mandatory program is halted.  As recently as January of 2004, a majority of 
producers nationally have indicated support for the mandatory checkoff.  A similar 
majority is found in a question on this survey seeking support estimates.  This research 
attempts to shed light on the question: is a voluntary beef checkoff feasible?  The 
problem was addressed using a mail survey with three objectives: (1) Measure producer 
preferences for a voluntary checkoff, (2) Use preferences to identify a utility maximizing 
checkoff and (3) Evaluate the impact of demographics and attitudes on preferences for a 
checkoff. 
All three objectives were accomplished through modeling founded in random 
utility theory.  Utility for a checkoff was assumed to be a function of checkoff attributes.  
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The specification of a utility function allows the measurement of preferences in order to 
realize objective one.  Preference for fee, minimum participation rate (MPR) and 
spending on advertising are the most significant contributors to utility for a checkoff.  
While preferences for these attributes are similar in a state and federal program, they are 
not identical.  Preferences for budget allocation reveal that advertising is the most 
preferred activity, especially in a state checkoff.  It seems that producers do not perceive 
a problem with out-of-state free-riding.  Given the apparent likelihood that state 
checkoffs would be the method of choice to replace the mandatory checkoff and the high 
probability that free-riding would occur, this is a finding that deserves more research. 
 Cheap talk and certainty calibration were employed to manage hypothetical bias.  
The effects of cheap talk are incorporated in all responses whereas certainty calibration 
may be used at the researcher’s discretion.  Due to hypothetical bias, uncalibrated data 
will likely overestimate willingness to donate, whereas calibrated data will likely provide 
unbiased or underestimated estimates.  This implies that true preferences should lie 
between calibrated and uncalibrated estimates, thus most results were presented as a 
range, specified with calibrated and uncalibrated data. 
A utility maximizing checkoff is also participation maximizing.  Under this 
design scheme, participation would is expected to be between 67% and 35% in a federal 
program and 69% and 43% in an Oklahoma checkoff (uncalibrated/calibrated estimates).  
These models included a MPR where all money is refunded if the participation target is 
not met.  Since this method risks triggering a total refund, a significant margin of safety 
should be included.  This was accomplished by constraining the model where the 
minimum participation rate must be exceeded by 20%.  Even with this constraint, 
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implementing a MPR carries a higher risk than not doing so.  Producers do not gain 
enough utility from a MPR to warrant this increased risk, at some point gains in 
participation from having the mechanism are offset by the increased requirement for 
participation. 
Utility maximization is but one objective that checkoff administrators might take, 
with another objective being revenue maximization.  The level at which fee is set is 
another way in which checkoff administrators have control of objectives.  The optimal 
fee in both checkoffs, and in both calibrated and uncalibrated models is below that of the 
current dollar ($.60/$.73 national; $.45/$.69 state; uncalibrated / calibrated).  Raising the 
fee to revenue maximizing levels, $1.21/$1.12 (federal) and $1.15/$1.11 (state), and not 
implementing a MPR reduces participation rates to somewhere between 22% - 38% and 
32% - 46% respectively. 
 Significant attention was paid to objective three, as demographics and attitudes 
theoretically play a role in utility for a checkoff.  The demographics studied were: cattle 
type sold, farm size, group membership and household income.  Cattle type and farm size 
have no noticeable effect on propensity to donate, with the exception of veal producers 
who are less likely to donate than their peers.  The fact that this is the only instance of 
homogeneity by farm type and size is simplifying for checkoff administration, especially 
given the small size of veal sales as a total of beef industry revenues.  If noticeable 
differences were found by farm demographics, a checkoff would need to be targeted 
towards those producers who were most likely to donate. 
Membership in several of the farm groups changes willingness to donate 
(American Farm Bureau, Oklahoma Cattleman’s Association and National Cattleman’s 
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Association).  All three groups in which a different propensity to donate is observed, are 
more likely to donate than the survey average.  It seems preferable to be surprised in the 
direction of underestimating participation, and it is thus recommended that group 
membership be assumed as not affecting utility for a checkoff. 
Income was dissected into five ranges and measured for effects on propensity to 
donate.  As income increases, so does the likelihood that a producer will donate.  This 
phenomenon plateaus in the range of $40,000-$49,000 (annual household income).  
Average survey income was approximately equal to the U.S. farm income average of 
$66,732.  Given that willingness to donate plateaus below average farm income, checkoff 
administrators need not worry about checkoff design specific to any particular income 
level. 
Like demographics, attitudes and opinions correlate with producer’s propensity to 
donate.  A significant and negative correlation exists between producers who feel that 
foreign producers receive benefits from checkoff activities that are greater than or equal 
to those of domestic producers.  Another notable result, one that may be of particular 
interest to any future checkoff designers, is the positive correlation between support of 
the current program and the observed propensity to donate.  This result suggests that most 
producers view a voluntary checkoff as a substitute for the current program.  To an extent 
higher than any other demographic or attitude, producers who support the current 
program are more likely to participate in a future voluntary program. 
 What has this paper sought to accomplish?  In a sentence, it could be said that the 
paper sought to estimate and explain free-riding under voluntary beef checkoffs.  
Expected participation was presented as a range generated by calibrated and uncalibrated 
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survey data.  For a national program, under a variety of checkoff designs a 22%-67% 
participation rate is expected.  Under similar designs, an Oklahoma checkoff could expect 
to see 32-69% participation.  While the cynic could easily claim that a range of 45% is 
wide enough to accommodate any participation rate, this range covers all the checkoffs 
designed in the paper and allows the reader to make adjustments in interpretation if she 
does not agree with the presentation.  For example, if the reader believes that the 
calibrated estimates do indeed underestimate willingness to donate, she could accept the 
uncalibrated data as the most accurate.  Furthermore, information has been gained 
through measuring preferences, measuring the expected impact of checkoff design and 
looking preferences that are heterogeneous by demographics. 
Any checkoff is a public good and will be subject to free-riding.  Designing 
optimal checkoffs, proposing alternative checkoffs and explaining the behaviors of 
various groups of people towards the programs are all attempts to estimate or explain 
how many people will choose to free-ride on the system.  The level of free-riding does 
not appear so significant as to make a checkoff infeasible, although administrators should 
carefully heed producer preferences.  One factor, which a hypothetical experiment cannot 
replicate, is apathy-induced participation.  Some producers will participate because the 
benefit derived from receiving a refund does not outweigh the transaction cost of 
requesting it.  Consider the voluntary Oklahoma wheat checkoff, a similar program to 
that which would likely emerge in the beef industry.  This program typically receives 
donations by about 80% of producers.  Ultimately however, moving to a voluntary 
program means that participation will be a result of producer perceptions.  Checkoff 
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administrators must design a checkoff with producer preferences in mind or sell their 
version of a checkoff in an attempt to change preferences. 
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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 
 513 Ag. Hall, Oklahoma State University 
 Stillwater, OK 74078-0488 
 Phone: 405-744-9821 
 Fax: 405-744-8210 
 e-mail: ceward@okstate.edu 
 
September 22, 2003 
 
  
 
Dear : 
 
The enclosed is a pretest questionnaire only.  We would like you to complete it as if your name 
was drawn in the survey sample.  Then we would like to know from you what needs to be 
deleted, added, clarified, etc.  Write your comments on the attached sheet and return them to us in 
the return envelope. 
 
At a later time, your name might be drawn in the random sample of persons to receive the survey.  
If so, please complete it as though you had not received this pretest mailing.  As always, thanks 
for your help and support of OSU. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Bailey Norwood    Clement Ward 
Assistant Professor   Professor and Extension Economist 
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Beef Checkoff Survey: Pretest Comments 
 
 
How long did the survey take to complete?   minutes 
 
Was the cover letter clear and understandable? Yes  No   
 If no, how could it be improved?        
            
    
 
Were there questions that were not clear or understandable? Yes  No   
 If yes, how could each be improved?  Question #    Suggestion to improve  
            
            
    
 
Question #    Suggestion to improve       
            
            
    
 
Question #    Suggestion to improve       
            
            
    
 
Question #    Suggestion to improve       
            
            
    
 
Are there questions that you think should be added to improve what we learn from this survey? 
Yes  No   
 If yes, please indicate your suggested question.       
            
            
    
 
If yes, please indicate your suggested question.        
            
            
    
 
If yes, please indicate your suggested question.        
            
            
    
Thanks for your help.  Please return this sheet and the completed questionnaire in the return 
envelope. 
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Table 21. Utility Model with all Fixed Effects Included Jointly 
Parameter Estimates From a Linear Utility 
Parameter (t-statistic) 
 Uncalibrated  Calibrated  Uncalibrated   Calibrated  
Variable Name       Variable Name (continued)     
Fee Federal  -0.852   -0.6875    -0.519    -0.5189 
 (-5.5909)***  (-4.2095)***   
 
Small Farm 
Large Income (-1.4656)     (-1.6569)*    
Adv Federal   1.5809    0.6341     0.3196   0.074 
 ( 2.2430)**  (1.0378)      
Cattleman’s 
Association (1.7184)*     (0.5011)    
Res Federal   -0.3795   -1.492   R-CALF -0.1573   0.3953 
 (-0.5230)     (-2.2167)**     (-0.1916)     (1.0282)    
Other Federal   -0.8337    -1.4532   NFU  -0.2418   -0.0123 
 (-1.1564)     (-2.2310)**    (-0.9556)     (-0.0541)    
MPR Federal   0.6678    0.5877    0.1381   0.0352 
 (2.2822)**   (1.8414)*   
OK Farm 
Bureau (0.8855)     (0.2589)    
Fee State  -1.4585    -1.0215    0.6115   0.631 
 (-8.9910)***  (-5.9240)***   
National Farm 
Bureau (1.5493)     (2.1105)**    
Adv State   1.6897   0.4375    0.4036   0.7002 
 (2.3488)**  (0.7351)      
$20,000-
$39,999 (1.2374)     (2.1912)**    
Res State   0.6027   -0.6383    0.8017   1.2103 
 (0.8303)     (-1.0228)      
$40,000-
$59,999 (2.4346)**     (3.8355)*** 
Other State  -0.5312   -1.9413    0.4452   0.7134 
 (-0.7428)     (-3.0314)***   
$60,000-
$79,999 (1.3350)     (2.2128)**    
MPR State  0.4877   0.8247   $80,000+  0.694   1.147 
 (1.6415)     (2.5609)***    (2.1010)**     (3.5266)*** 
 0.2824   -0.5134   Aware   0.3872   0.4203 Calves, Feeder, 
Purebred (0.4918)     (-1.0753)       (2.2187)**   (2.9349)*** 
Veal Calves  -1.0074   -0.8863   Eliminate    -3.3715     -2.8852 
 (-3.4959)***  (-3.2166)***    (-19.4908)***   (-12.6641)*** 
Large   -0.3909   -0.247   Foreign  0.208   -0.0738 
 (-2.1056)**  (-1.5430)       (1.1355)     (-0.4518)    
Small  0.2189    0.1457       
  (1.0666)      (0.8149)              
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%,5%and 1%  Sample Size 1259-calibrated, 1278-uncalibrated. 
Log-likelihood function value –987.4-calibrated, -1,027-uncalibrated 
Notes:  Parameter estimates from a linear utility model including all demographic and attitudinal data used 
in the paper, see chapters five and three for demographic/attitudinal and attribute variable descriptions. 
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APPENDIX C  Survey 
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This survey asks your opinion on a hypothetical voluntary beef checkoff.  We are 
interested in your input.  Please read the following information before answering 
the following questions.  We would like you to consider a hypothetical voluntary 
checkoff.  This a potential checkoff that might emerge if the current checkoff is 
eliminated.  The voluntary checkoff would be implemented as follows. 
 
¾ Checkoff funds would be collected as a fee per head sold—just as they are now 
¾ Any producer may request for their checkoff fees to be refunded in full 
¾ Collections remaining after refunds would then be spent on checkoff programs 
(e.g. generic advertising and promotion, beef safety research, etc.) 
¾ However, if a minimum participation rate (defined as the percent of producers 
who do not request a refund) is not met, all funds will be returned—regardless of 
whether it was requested. 
 
Below are three options.  Options A and B represent different voluntary checkoffs you 
could participate in by not requesting your refund.  If you would request a refund instead 
of participating in Options A or B, please choose Option C.   
 
1)  Please check the ONE option you prefer the most if this were a nationwide 
voluntary beef checkoff, assuming these are the only options available.  These are 
hypothetical checkoffs, and studies have found that people overstate their 
willingness to participate in hypothetical situations.  Before answering, please think 
hard about how you would choose if it entailed giving up real money. 
 
Checkoff 
Attribute 
 
Option A Option B Option C 
Checkoff Fee 
 
 
$0.70 / head sold $0.75 / head sold 
Minimum 
Participation 
Rate 
 
55% 10% 
Percent of 
Funds Spent on 
Advertising and 
Promotion 
 
53% 65% 
Percent of 
Funds Spent on 
Research 
 
10% 15% 
Percent Spent 
on Other 
Activities* 
 
37% 20% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither A nor B is 
preferred.  If these were 
the only two options 
available, I would 
request my checkoff 
fees be refunded in full. 
 
 
I would choose 
(please check 
ONLY ONE 
OPTION) 
I choose option A 
and would not 
request a refund 
 
I choose Option B 
and would not 
request a refund 
I choose neither A 
nor B.  I would 
request a refund 
*Other activities includes foreign marketing, industry information, consumer education and personal communications. 
If you chose Options A or B in Question 1, please answer the following question. 
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2)  On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means "very uncertain" and 10 means "very certain",  
how certain are you that you would voluntarily pay the checkoff fee for the option 
you chose?  (CIRCLE ONE NUMBER) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
 
3)  Please check the ONE option you prefer the most if this were a statewide 
voluntary beef checkoff, assuming these are the only options available.   
 
Checkoff 
Attribute 
 
Option A Option B Option C 
Checkoff Fee 
 
 
1.40 1.15 
Minimum 
Participation Rate 
 
70% 15% 
Percent of Funds 
Spent on 
Advertising and 
Promotion 
 
15% 61% 
Percent of Funds 
Spent on Research 
 
43% 0% 
Percent Spent on 
Other Activities* 
 
42% 39% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither A nor B is preferred.  If 
these were the only two options 
available, I would request my 
checkoff fees be refunded in full. 
 
 
I would choose 
(please check 
ONLY ONE 
OPTION) 
I choose option A 
and would not 
request a refund 
 
I choose 
Option B and 
would not 
request a 
refund 
I choose neither A nor B.  I 
would request a refund 
*Other activities includes foreign marketing, industry information, consumer education and personal communications. 
 
If you chose Options A or B in Question 3, please answer the following question. 
 
4)  On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means "very uncertain" and 10 means "very certain",  
how certain are you that you would voluntarily pay the checkoff fee for the option 
you chose?  (CIRCLE ONE NUMBER) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
 
 
very 
uncertain 
very 
certain
very 
uncertain 
very 
certain
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Now, please describe your cattle operation and views on the beef checkoff by 
answering the following questions.   
 
5)  In the boxes below, please indicate the average number of cattle and calves you sold in the past year.  
 
Average number of weaned calves sold per year 
 
 
 
 
Average number of feeder cattle sold per year 
 
 
 
 
Average number of fed cattle sold per year 
 
 
 
 
Average number of veal calves sold per year 
 
 
 
 
Average number of purebred heifers and bulls sold per year 
 
 
 
 
6)  Do you raise beef, dairy, or both cattle breeds?  
 
 
 
 
7)  Please check any farm organizations in which you are a member. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 other (please list) ________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
8)  Were you aware of the recent litigation and court rulings on the beef checkoff before receiving this 
survey?   
 
 
 
9)  Which best describes your feelings toward the challenge to the mandatory beef checkoff?  
 
 
 
50- 
99 
less than 
50 
100- 
199 
200- 
499 
500 
or greater 
none 
100- 
499 
less than 
100 
500- 
999 
1,000- 
5,000 
5,000  
or greater 
500- 
1,000 
less than 
500 
1,000- 
10,000 
10,000- 
20,000 
20,000  
or greater 
50- 
99 
less than 
50 
100- 
199 
200- 
499 
500  
or greater 
beef breeds 
only 
dairy breeds 
only 
both beef and 
dairy breeds 
no yes 
I am in favor of 
eliminating the 
mandatory beef 
checkoff 
I am in favor of 
keeping the 
mandatory beef 
checkoff 
Undecided 
National  or State 
Cattleman's Beef  
Associations 
R-Calf 
USA 
National  
Farmers  
Union 
American 
Farm Bureau 
Association 
50- 
99 
less than 
50 
100- 
199 
200- 
499 
500  
or greater 
none 
none 
none 
none 
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10)  Do you feel beef checkoff expenditures on advertising benefits cattle producers or beef processors and 
retailers more?   
 
 
 
 
 
11)  Do you feel beef checkoff expenditures on research benefits cattle producers or beef processors and 
retailers more?   
 
 
 
 
 
12)  How do you feel the beef checkoff funds benefit cattle and beef producers outside of the U.S.?   
 
 
 
 
13)  As close as you can recall, please estimate your household's yearly income before taxes by checking 
the  
appropriate box.  This question is used to ensure our sample is representative of all producers.  Please 
remember that your responses will be held strictly confidential. 
 
 
 
 
 
14)  Do you have any comments you would like to add?  If so, please list them below. 
 
 
On behalf of Oklahoma State University, we thank  you for your 
time! 
 
 
Clem Ward, 
College of Agriculture Sciences and Natural Resources 
Oklahoma State University 
 
Oklahoma State University, in compliance with Title VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Executive Order 11246 as amended, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and other federal laws and regulations, 
does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age, religion, 
disability, or status as a veteran in any of its policies, practices, or procedures. 
More than 
U.S. producers 
Equal to 
U.S. producers 
Less than U.S. 
producers 
Other or 
not sure 
less than 
$20,000  
 $20,000- 
 $39,999 
 $40,000- 
 $59,999 
 $60,000- 
 $79,999 
 $80,000 or 
greater 
Benefits cattle 
producers more 
Benefits beef 
processors and 
retailers more 
Undecided Benefits both 
equally 
Benefits cattle 
producers more 
Benefits beef 
processors and 
retailers more 
Undecided Benefits both 
equally 
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